A Right to Treatment for Juveniles? by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1973 
Issue 1 Symposium: United States v. Brawner 
January 1973 
A Right to Treatment for Juveniles? 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Juvenile Law Commons, and the Law and Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
A Right to Treatment for Juveniles?, 1973 WASH. U. L. Q. 157 (1973). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
NOTES
A RIGHT TO TREATMENT FOR JUVENILES?
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the twentieth century, juveniles were handled within the
same legal process as adults." The first juvenile court, founded in
1899, was designed as a separate legal process to handle juveniles
apart from the adult criminal system. Its underlying premises were
that children require special handling and care,3 and that the juvenile
court judge was to provide the juvenile with sensitive, wise guidance.
Underlying this approach was the concept of parens patriae4 -a phi-
1. Several early English cases can be found in which juveniles were sentenced as
harshly as adults, although children below the age of seven were conclusively presumed
incapable of possessing criminal intent. See generally R. PERKINS, PERK:iNs ON CRIMI-
NAL LAW 837-40 (2d ed. 1969); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 106
(1909).
2. For history of the first juvenile court, see R. PERKINS, supra note 1, at 837-
40; Glueck, Some "Unfinished Business" of the Management of Juvenile Delinquency,
15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 628 n.2 (1964). Even before the establishment of a separate
lcgal system for juveniles, however, separate places of juvenile incarceration existed.
See Mack, supra note 1, at 106; Mennel, Origins of the Juvenile Court, 18 CRIME AND
DFLINQUENCY 68, 70-77 (1972). See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCE-
MENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, U.S. TASK FORCE: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
AND YOUTH CRIME REPORT 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE: JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY]. One commentator has summed up the impact of the juvenile court
system to be that the children charged with crimes were not to be treated as criminals
but rather as dependent and neglected children. Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of
thc Juvenile Courts, 7 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 97, 99 (1961).
3. Sece In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967); Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 554-55
(1966): In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 600, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 793 (1955); Mack, supra note 1, at 104-07; Cooley, Court Control
Oi'e, Ticatment of Juvenile Offenders, 9 DUQUESNE L. REv. 613, 614 (1971). But see
Langley, Graves, Norris, The Juvenile Court and Individualized Treatment, 18 CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY 79 (1972) (authors statistically endeavor to show that the goal of
individualized handling is far from being achieved).
4. Parens patriae literally translates as "Father of the Country." Its origins date
back to the feudal Chancery Court. Its jurisdiction was exercised on behalf of minors
whose property rights were jeopardized, on the theory that the state could protect the
minors who otherwise were impoverished and neglected. Once this notion was trans-
planted into the United States, protective jurisdiction was extended to include personal
injuries as well, but was limited to neglected and dependent children. Eventually, al-
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losophy based on the belief that the state has a duty to take any needed
affirmative action on behalf of its wards. The due process safeguards
of the adult criminal system were generally deemed incompatible' with
parens patriae. Since 1966, however, the Supreme Court has initiated
a re-examination of the juvenile adjudication phase, and has held that
certain due process controls are constitutionally required in juvenile de-
linquency hearings. 6 One rationale behind these decisions is that the
juvenile was getting the "worst of both worlds,' 7 being accorded nei-
ther due process safeguards nor substantial treatment benefits. The
proposition that juveniles are constitutionally entitled to a "right to
treatment," however, would enable the juvenile to have the "best of
both worlds."
This note will examine whether the Constitution requires the judi-
ciary to recognize a medically and psychiatrically oriented juvenile right
to treatment. To assist in this analysis, the closely related concept of a
right to treatment in the mental health8 area will be relied upon. This
intermixing of the mental health and juvenile definitions of a right to
treatment, however, is not a strained one. The juvenile justice proc-
though the precise reason for the expansion is unclear, it was extended to children
accused of criminal law violations. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1967); TASK
FoRCE: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 2, at 2. See also Mack, supra note 1, at
104-09.
5. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1967); TASK FoRCE: JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY, supra note 2, at 3.
6. In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the United States Supreme
Court held that a waiver by the District of Columbia juvenile court over "the exclusive
jurisdiction" of a juvenile could properly occur only with the assistance of counsel
after a hearing. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), established that adequate and timely
notice of a proceeding and the nature of the charges against the juvenile must be filed.
The juvenile has a right to have counsel appointed and present at a delinquency hearing.
And if there is no confession by the juvenile, he has the right to confrontation and
cross-examination. The Court, in the case of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 558 (1970), held
that the standard proof to be applied to delinquency adjudications must be the same as
in criminal trials-beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court's majority held that a jury trial is not constitutionally re-
quired in state juvenile delinquency proceedings, since jury trials are not essential to
accurate fact-finding. For a review of the legislative response to these cases, see
Speca & White, Variations and Trends in Proposed Legislation on Juvenile Courts, 40
U.M.K.C.L. REv. 129 (1972).
7. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). See also In re Contreras,
109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952), in which the court noted the ad-
verse impact a juvenile court adjudication can have on the juvenile regarding employ-
ment and military service.
8. See notes 19-23 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the develop-
ment of the right to treatment in the mental health process.
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ess" can be understood to be a hybrid between the criminal system and
the mental health process. Like the criminal system, the juvenile proc-
ess is concerned with the apprehension and appropriate disposition of
criminal law violators. Similarities can be seen in the arrest, charging,
and hearing stages. But the juvenile process is also like the mental
health process. Nonpolice'0 and noncriminal" referrals may occur in
9. Whether the label is "process" or "system" really makes little difference in
the context of this article, since little variance in legal consequences results from
selection of either label. A "system" implies some unity of purpose between the three
component parts, which include law enforcement, the judicial and corrections proc-
esses. In a "process" these individual components function independently of each other.
See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF
VIOLENCE. TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE, TO INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY 149 (1969).
10. A person may come into contact with both the juvenile and mental health
processes by referrals from other than the police. In the mental health process,
voluntary admissions to institutions comprise forty percent of the mental health com-
mitments. See S. BRAKEL & R. RocK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 17
(1970) [hereinafter cited as BRAKEL]. Two general criteria for voluntary admissions
are that space will be available and that the prospective patient will benefit from treat-
ment. There is no absolute right to hospitalization or to treatment. Voluntary sub-
missions are viewed favorably because the patient will be more cooperative in the
treatment effort. Whenever a parent places a minor in a mental institution it is re-
garded as a voluntary commitment regardless of the state of mind of the child. Id.
at 17-22.
In the juvenile process referrals may come from other than the police: parents,
social agencies, and others have direct recourse to the courts. TASK FORCE: JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY, supra note 2, at 5, 14. However, voluntary submissions may not be
given any consideration in the juvenile correctional process. See People v. Lynn, 17
Mich. App. 117, 169 N.W.2d 185 (1969) (voluntary preconviction commitment to a
state rehabilitation program did not bar a subsequent conviction and sentence for the
offense which had been "served").
1 I. In the juvenile process, the juvenile court may assume jurisdiction without the
juvenile having committed a criminal offense. The number of children in this category
of non-delinquents (persons in need of supervision) compose twenty-five to thirty
percent of the children appearing before juvenile courts and in juvenile institutions.
TASK FORCE: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 2, at 4; Kittrie, Can a Right to
Trearment Rcmcdy the Ills of the Juvenile Process, 57 GEO. L.J. 848, 858 n.40 (1969).
There has been criticism that laws allowing jurisdiction of juveniles are too vague. See
Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (New York's "wayward minor"
law unconstitutionally vague). Contra, Commonwealth v. Brasher, - Mass. -, 270
N.E.2d 389 (1971). In the mental health process, one may be institutionalized voluntari-
ly because of a mental illness without a violation of criminal laws as a requisite.
BRAKEL, supra note 10, at 17-26.
For an article which deals with non-delinquent juveniles and a right to treatment,
see Gough, The Beyond-Control Child and The Right to Treatment: An Exercise in
the Synthesis of Paradox, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 182 (1972). For an article that ap-
proaches the right to treatment from an analogy to the adult prison system, see Note,
The Courts, The Constitution and Juvenile Institutional Reform, 52 B.U.L. REv. 35
(1972).
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both, and the dispositional philosophy espouses treatment as an over-
riding end.12  Also, unlike the criminal system, in which a conviction
leads to an automatic and permanent denial of certain civil rights,'
there is no equivalent consequence in either the mental health14 or the
juvenile process.' 5 Finally, the arguments for the right to treatment in
both processes rely heavily upon the medical sciences, especially psy-
chiatry and psychology. If the mental health definition for a right to
treatment' 6 were subsumed into the juvenile process, each youth would
be entitled to "such individual treatment and care as will give .. .
[him] a realistic opportunity to be cured and to improve his or her
mental condition,"'17 thus helping him become a mature and law-abid-
ing citizen.
12. The philosophy of treatment as a prime objective in selecting an appropriate
disposition of each individual in both the juvenile and mental health system is similar.
This can be seen in cases which uphold juvenile court acts and mental health laws.
For cases upholding the former, see, e.g., Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N.E.
892 (1913); Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205 (1929). For a case
upholding sexual psychopath laws, see Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
13. A person convicted of a crime automatically and permanently loses the right
to vote, to hold office, and to act as a trustee. Other civil rights may be suspended
during incarceration or parole. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, U.S. TASK FORCE: CORRECTIONS REPORT 88-92
(1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE: CORRECTIONS]; Milligan, California's Parole
Rules, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 275 (1969).
14. Cf. BRAKEL, supra note 10, at 21-22, 303-13, 250-65.
15. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967); In re Smith, 637 Misc. 2d 198, 310
N.Y.S.2d 617 (Fam. Ct. 1970).
16. An often quoted definition of a right to treatment for juveniles was proposed
by Judge Ketcham. See Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Courts, 7
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 97, 101 (1961) (emphasis added):
The state, through its juvenile courts, must demonstrate that it is conscien-
tiously striving to achieve the rehabilitation it promises, and that (though
it makes no promise to actually bring about the reformation of the child) it
will seek to employ the best institutional, probationary, medical, psychiatric,
and other techniques in providing for each child to develop into a mature and
law-abiding citizen.
Cf. Faust, Implementing the Juvenile's Right to Treatment, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REvIEw
256 (1970).
A second reason the definition of juvenile treatment was drawn from the mental
health definition is that the prior judicial handling of "treatment" is not helpful to our
inquiry. The word "treatment" has received attention in contexts unrelated to the pres-
ent inquiry. See, e.g., Fason v. State, 19 Ala. 533, 98 So. 702 (1924) (minimum ac-
tivity to bring one within criminal malpractice acts); El Rio Oils v. Chase, 95 Cal.
App. 2d 402, 212 P.2d 929 (1949) (to define a chemical reagent process); Berle v.
Travelers Protective Ass'n, 135 Mo. App. 629, 135 S.W.2d 497 (1940) (to determine
the coverage of insurance policies).
17. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Accord, Rouse v.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/10
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The mental health right to treatment cases deal with institutionalized
individuals. For this note, the same definition will also be applied to
non-institutional settings. This is because juveniles, as a result of for-
mal adjudications, may be placed in various institutions,' such as de-
tention centers, work camps, training schools, and medium and maxi-
mum security facilities. In reference to this type of disposition the right
to treatment will be labeled the right to institutional treatment. Or the
juveniles may be formally or informally placed in the community on
probation or in aftercare programs. Right to treatment in this commu-
nity framework will be called the right to noninstitutional treatment.
II. THE RIGHT TO INSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT AND ITS
DEVELOPMENT IN THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS
The concept of a right to treatment emerged as a due process
argument designed to enable courts to force state legislatures to ap-
propriate needed funds to provide adequate psychiatric and medical
care for the mentally ill.'" To date, few courts have indicated an ac-
ceptance of the constitutional arguments,20 and only one court has
found the right to be a statutory requisite. 2 Legislative provisions for
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1967). For the purposes of this note, how-
ever, the definition of treatment will exclude both routine medical attention and medi-
cal care needed for the removal of physical scars or emergency blood transfusion.
See, ei'.. Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (blood transfusion); People v.
Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952) (blood trans-
fusion), In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955) (correcting hairlip); In re
Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fain. Ct. 1970) (correcting facial scar).
18. For the variety of institutions in which a juvenile may be placed by the
juvenile authorities, see, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 880 et seq. (Deering 1966).
However, there are some limitations on the use of these institutions. See In re E.M.D.,
490 P.2d 658 (Alas. 1971) (a child in need of supervision may not be placed in a
juvenile institution); In re P. (Anonymous), 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125
(1970) (institutionalization was not proper when the juvenile was diagnosed as a
"bad risk" for institutionalization); In re Braun, 145 N.W.2d 482 (N.D. 1966) (preg-
nant unwed girl not to be institutionalized when there are no facilities for child care
and when the child's father wishes to marry the girl).
19. See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Editorial,
A New Right, id. at 516.
20. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (due proc-
ess): Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 604-06 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (cruel and
unusual punishment).
21. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (statutory right to treat-
ment for persons committed on a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity); Millard
v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (statutory right to treatment for sexual
psychopaths).
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a right to treatment have also been rare. Although eleven states have
adopted "humane care and treatment" provisions,"2 these statutes have
proved to be of limited utility. The one specific legislative attempt to
enact an explicit, effective, enforceable right to treatment failed.23
Numerous constitutional arguments have been advanced in court and
by commentators for a mental health right to treatment. Reliance on
these arguments by advocates of a constitutional right to treatment for
juveniles necessitates a review of the possible constitutional arguments
for a mental health right to treatment.
Several arguments are premised on the due process clause of the
fifth or fourteenth amendments. The first due process argument for
the right is that treatment must be supplied in exchange for the lack of
full procedural safeguards.24 The second due process argument is that
institutionalization without treatment would deprive the patient of the
implied promise of commitment law (i.e. that adequate treatment
will be provided), and to allow that promise to be unfulfilled violates
22. For a recent collection of these statutes, see Comment, Juvenile Law-An
Important Step Toward Recognition of the Constitutional Right to Treatment, 16 ST.
Louis U.LJ. 340, 344 n.8 (1972). It is not clear that these humane care and treatment
provisions truly evidence a legislative intention for a right to treatment. These stat-
utes, such as Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.840 (1969) (emphasis added), generally provide:
Every patient shall be entitled to humane care and treatment, and, to the
extent that facilities, equipment and personnel are available, to medical care
and treatment in accordance with the highest standards accepted in medical
practices.
The italicized portion of the statute severely limits its effectiveness as a practical mat-
ter. If the statute omitted such language (see TEx. Rnv. Crv. STAT. ANN. § 547-70
(1958)), the argument that an effective, enforceable right to treatment is the legisla-
tive intention would be stronger. A second problem with these statutes is that the term
"medical" treatment or care does not necessarily include psychiatric treatment. But
cf. T x. R v. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 547-70 (1958).
23. A proposed Pennsylvania Right to Treatment Law, which is set out in full at
57 GEo. L.J. 811-17 (1969), and discussed in Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right,
57 GEo. L.J 752, 763-65 (1969); Halpern, A Practicing Lawyer Views the Right to
Treatment, 57 Gao. L.J. 782, 806-11 (1969), is an example of a clear statutory grant
of a right to treatment, but it failed enactment.
24. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (sentencing
scheme whereby incarceration automatically results seen as providing less protection to
defendants than civil commitment procedures); Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater,
353 Mass. 604, 612, 233 N.E.2d 908, 913 (1968); Goodman, Right to Treatment:
The Responsibility of the Courts, 57 Gao. L.J. 680, 687-88 (1969) (comparing the
lack of safeguards in mandatory and civil commitments vis-h-vis the criminal systems
procedural protections). The procedural due process argument can be forcefully as-
serted when mandatory sentencing schemes are used. See Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642
(D.C. Cir. 1968). But see Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 515 (4th Cir. 1964) (up.
holding the procedural commitment process to the Patuxent Institution).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/10
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substantive due process .2  A third due process argument, very similar
to the second, is that it is morally reprehensible and a denial of funda-
mental fairness to refuse patients treatment they need.26
There are four possible arguments based on equal protection. First,
some criminals who are institutionalized are afforded more procedural
protections in the commitment process than others who are institution-
alized. To justify this inequality, some rational justification, such as
the provision of intensive treatment to the less fully protected group,
must be found.2 7  Secondly, since a person committed to an institution
under mental health laws may be confined for a longer period than if
sentenced under criminal statutes, the justification for longer incarcera-
tion must be the provision of treatment. -8  Thirdly, because treatment
of particular cases is to be related to "varying circumstances, '29 treat-
ment must be individualized. Therefore, indiscriminate mixing of in-
carcerated persons without the maintenance of separate treatment pro-
grams designed for each individual would violate the equal protection
clause. The final equal protection argument combines the funda-
25. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See Goodman,
supra note 24, at 689-90; Kittrie, supra note 11, at 870. One interpretation of the
attitude of some courts indicates that if a right to treatment were to be based on sub-
stantive due process, what is "substantively due" may well depend on the reason the
person is in the institution. Those convicted of a crime would be entitled to less
treatment since traditional notions justifying incarceration or incapacitation and de-
terrence would dilute the treatment "owed" by the state to the incarcerated person.
For example, if both X and Y suffer from the same mental illness, and X commits a
crime and Y does not, Y would be "owed" more treatment by the state. See Dobson v.
Cameron, 383 F.2d 519, 523-24 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J., concurring); State v.
Pooley, 278 Minn. 67, 73, 153 N.W.2d 143, 146 (1967); In re Jones, 432 Pa. 44,
246 A.2d 356 (1968).
26. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See Birnbaum,
The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 503 (1960); Kittrie, supra note 11, at 864.
This moral indignation argument is also expressed more forcefully in terms of the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See notes 34-35 infra and accom-
panying text. See also Bassiouni, The Right to the Mentally III to Care and Treatment:
Medical Due Process, 15 DEPAuL L. REv. 291, 310-11 (1965).
27. This argument is really the procedural due process argument couched in equal
protection terms. See Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 509 (4th Cir. 1964); Kittrie,
supra note I1, at 864; note 24 supra.
28. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Kittrie, supra
note 11, at 864. If treatment is rendered, indeterminate sentences may be needed to
encourage the patient to cooperate in the treatment process. See Daniels v. Director
of Patuxent Institution, 243 Md. 16, 39-40, 221 A.2d 397, 410-11 (1966).
29. Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater, 353 Mass. 604, 612, 233 N.E.2d 908,
913 (1968).
0. The premise of "varying circumstances" and "individualized treatment" springs
163
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mental interest 3' and the "wealth"'3 2 equal protection cases. If "men-
tal sanity" is a fundamental interest, the state cannot discriminate
against enjoyment of that interest and is required to provide the treat-
ment that wealthier people could afford privately.33
Two arguments stem from the cruel and unusual punishment provi-
sion of the Constitution. First, because mental illness is a condition, it
cannot, following the reasoning of Robinson v. California,3 4 be crimi-
from the reason that one is institutionalized. The "varying circumstances" could re-
fer to merely whether one has committed a crime, or to the medical-psychiatric ra-
tionale used to accomplish institutionalization (such as whether one was "incompetent
to stand trial" or a sex offender). Once this reference is established, the equal protec-
tion argument against intermixing would follow. This argument can be seen in Nason
v. Superintendent of Bridgewater, 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968); Common-
wealth v. Mogan, 341 Mass. 372, 170 N.E.2d 327 (1960); Commonwealth v. Page,
339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959). By "individualized treatment," personal psy-
chotherapy is not demanded, but rather the treatment which is rendered must be
geared to the needs of that particular group. Cf. State v. McCauley, 50 Wis. 2d 597,
608, 184 N.W.2d 908, 914 (1971).
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has also intimated that state hospitals
where people are involuntarily confined must have equal facilities. See Nason v. Super-
intendent of Bridgewater, 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908, 913 (1968). But see
McLamore v. State, - S.C. -, -, 185 S.E.2d 250, 256 (1972) (no equal protection
violation in some prisons having rehabilitation facilities while others do not have such
facilities). The difficulty with the Massachusetts approach is that the facilities may be
equally terrible.
31. The Supreme Court has indicated that certain fundamental interests exist.
Weber v. Aetna Casulty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (right of illegitimate chil-
dren to recover under workmen's compensation); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
681 (1969) (interstate travel); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (tort recovery
of illegitimates); Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation). See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d
584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (education). See generally Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. Rv. 1065, 1120-31 (1969).
32. Some Supreme Court cases have indicated that discrimination based on one's
wealth violates equal protection. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 745 (1967);
Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 357 (1964); Griffin v. Illinois, 352 U.S. 12, 16 (1956).
33. Cf. Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1968). But see
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en bane). This argument
is one that has not clearly been enunciated by a court or commentator. Nevertheless,
the seeds of the argument have clearly been planted. See note 90 infra.
34. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The Court also stated, in dictum, at 666:
It is unlikely that any state at this moment in history would attempt to make
it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be
afflicted with venereal disease. A state might determine that the general
health and welfare require that the victims of these and other human afflic-
tions be dealt with by compulsory treatment involving quarantine, confinement,
or sequestration. But, in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law
which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtlessly be uni-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/10
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nally punished, and incarcerations can be justified only by the provision
of adequate treatment. Secondly, indefinite confinement without treat-
ment of one not found to be criminally responsible is so inhumane as to
amount to cruel and unusual punishment.3Y
Whatever the ultimate fate of these arguments in determining the ex-
istence of a right to treatment in the mental health process, it is their
applicability and validity in the juvenile justice process that must be esti-
mated.
III. INSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT IN THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE PROCESS
The constitutional arguments advanced in the mental health process
can also be advanced in the juvenile process. But even without a men-
tal health right to treatment, the arguments for a juvenile right to insti-
tutional treatment may be advanced on two grounds. First, because
juveniles are at an impressionable stage of development, adequate and
proper treatment would be effective;36 and second, a right to institutional
treatment in the juvenile process would improve the conditions of insti-
tutional living.3 7
A. The Requisite Judicial Attitude
To foster the creation of a juvenile right to institutional treatment,
the judicial outlook toward the function of the judiciary in juvenile cor-
rections will have to change. In early cases the judiciary refused to in-
quire as to the existence of juvenile treatment facilities or into a facility's
suitability for treatment purposes. 8s However, the courts have moved
versally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
35. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Accord, Ramsey v.
Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 604-05 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (emphasis original): "[T]here
is a constitutional duty to provide needed medical treatment to a prisoner because the
intentional denial to a prisoner of needed medical treatment is cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, and violates the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."
36. Further, the recent procedural safeguards extended to juveniles at the adjudica-
tory stage can be squared with a right to treatment concept. Implementation of the
procedural guarantees will lead the youth to believe that he is being fairly treated, and
will therefore respond more positively to treatment efforts. See Cooley, supra note 3,
at 617; Lipsitt, Due Process as a Gateway to Rehabilitation in the Juvenile System, 49
B.U.L. RES,. 62, 65 (1969).
37. See Note, The Courts, The Constitution and Juvenile Institutional Reform,
52 B.U.L. REv. 35, 49-62 (1972).
38. Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1953); In re Ragan, 125
Vol. 1973:1571
Washington University Open Scholarship
166 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1973:157
from the traditional deference to correctional authorities toward an in-
creased willingness to examine the physical conditions, practices, and
facilities of the place of confinement, as indicated in recent mental
health,39 prison,40 and juvenile cases. 41  The writ of habeas corpus42
and the Civil Rights Act of 187143 have been two prominent methods
to initiate such inquiries. 44
La. 121, 51 So. 89 (1910); State ex rel. Sowder v. Superior Court, 195 Wash. 684,
179 P.2d 951 (1919). See also Gault v. Board of Directors, 103 Ariz. App. 397,
442 P.2d 844, 847 (1968); In re Wiggins, 425 P.2d 1004 (Okla. 1967); Carter v.
Montoya, 75 N.M. 730, 410 P.2d 951 (1966).
39. See, e.g., Tippet v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); McCray v. State, 10 ClM. L. REP.
2132 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 11, 1971).
40. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 379 (1972); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969); Cunningham v. Wingo, 443 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1971); Newman v. State, 349
F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va.
1971); Hamilton v. Love, 329 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Sawyer v. Sigler,
320 F. Supp.. 690 (D. Neb.), affd, 445 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Hendricks,
11 Cnms. L. REP. 2088 (Pa. C.P. April 7, 1972).
41. See notes 114, 117 infra.
42. Habeas corpus has been used most frequently to challenge the inadequacy of
the "place of confinement." In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 258-60 (1894); Dixon v.
Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 597-600 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106, 110
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 458-59 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415,
419-21 (D.C. Cir. 1953); White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D.D.C. 1954). But
see Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 663-64 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J., dissenting),
in which Judge Burger argued that habeas should be limited to the original purpose of
the writ-testing the legality of confinement. See generally Developments in the Law
-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HAgv. L. REV. 1038, 1072-87 (1970).
43. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
This provision may be used in class action form. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325
F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
One commentator has suggested that overreliance on § 1983 may lead to the require-
ment of exhaustion of state remedies or the application of the abstention doctrines.
Angel, Some Procedural Problems Involved in Bringing a Right to Treatment Suit 23
(unpublished manuscript of an address delivered at Georgetown University, June 1,
1971, and on file in the offices of the Washington University Law Quarterly). But see
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (prisoners' claim for relief under 1983
not subject to exhaustion requirement); Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 459 F.2d 63 (8th
Cir. 1972) (exhaustion requirement not applicable to 1983 actions).
44. There are three other ways the issue of a right to treatment may be raised:
mandamus; original appeal; and injunction. In the choice of a procedural vehicle,
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Before a court can analytically reach the merits of the constitutional
arguments and be amenable to the handling of treatment as a right, it
will have to adopt a stance, explicitly or implicitly, regarding the pro-
fessionals and sciences involved in the institutional treatment process.
Whatever stance is assumed, it will also reflect a determination by the
court of the proper role of the judiciary in the treatment process. If a
court lacks confidence in the efficacy of the treatment sciences and in
their application by the professionals involved, it would most likely
guide youths away from post-adjudication institutional processing, ex-
cept for that institutionalization which is absolutely required by law.
A second stance for a court is that, because the treatment sciences can-
not presently fulfill the promise of actual cure despite the court's confi-
dence in the individual professionals, s the presently established means
of handling individuals will be continued. This is the position that the
Supreme Court has apparently adopted. If a court has confidence in
several factors must be considered. First, if the case involves only one individual, the
case may be mooted by a release or transfer of the individual. Guy v. Ciccone, 439
F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1971); Solomon v. Cameron, 377 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See
Angel, supra note 43, at 19; Halpern, supra note 23, at 799-800. This problem of
mootness may be avoided by a class action. Compare Valvano v. McGrath, 325 F.
Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (allowing class action), with Inmates of Milwaukee County
Jail v. Peterson, 51 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (class action by inmates of Milwau-
kee jail disallowed). Also bearing on the issue of the availability of a class action is
the similarity of the class members' needs. Compare Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825
(E.D. Ark. 1969) (allowing class action by Arkansas prison inmates), with Lollis v.
Social Services, 322 F. Supp. 473, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (disallowing at that time a
class action on behalf of all those subjected to solitary confinement). A second
factor is the relief that is ultimately sought. A court will be more willing to prohibit
certain practices rather than order expensive treatment. The third consideration is
whether to file in state or federal courts. Federal courts, although generally considered
more progressive, will probably be hesitant to order expensive treatment when the
state will have to bear the cost of treatment. See Angel, supra note 43, at 17-23. Two
practical problems in bringing treatment suits are money, especially in discovery costs,
and an enormous time needed for trial preparation. See Faust, Implementing the
Juvenile's Right to Treatment, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 256 (1972).
45. The problems involved in a right to treatment are interdisciplinary, and the
evidence is not conclusive whether the treatment sciences can or cannot effectively
treat individuals. See J. CONRAD, EUROPEAN CORu-cnoNs 18 (1966); S. WHEELER
& L. COATRELL, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL 3 (1966);
LeVine & Bornstein, Is the Sociopath Treatable? The Contribution of Psychiatry to a
Legal Dilemma, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 693.
46. The Supreme Court has apparently adopted the attitude that, at the present
time, the treatment sciences cannot effectively accomplish actual treatment. Two
lines of cases support this conclusion. First is the Kent-Gault-Winship-McKeiver quar-
tet, which seems to indicate that the Supreme Court is going to force the juvenile
courts to make sure that at an adjudication hearing that the "accused" juvenile really
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both the efficacy of the treatment sciences and its application by the
professionals, however, it would not need to be directly involved, since
the court would consider that the individuals are receiving the neces-
sary treatment. In this third outlook the judicial involvement would
be only peripheral, with judicial review limited to examining adminis-
trative intra-institutional decisions.47 Finally if a court has confidence in
the sciences of treatment, but less confidence in the professionals in-
volved, the degree of court involvement becomes the crucial issue.
If a court desires a passive role, it might establish an advisory panel
of experts48 and follow its recommendations. But if a court desires an
active role, the right to institutional treatment would provide the ve-
hicle to accomplish that involvement most readily. This would then
enable the courts to participate in the actual treatment decisions as well
as influence the crucial questions of resource allocation.
B. Three Assumptions Underlying the Possible Constitutional Argu-
ments
Before reaching the merits of the constitutional arguments, it is neces-
sary to identify and examine the three assumptions upon which the right
to institutional treatment depends. The manner in which courts handle
these assumptions will determine whether the constitutional arguments
was the one who committed the anti-social act. If the Court had been convinced of
the ability of the treatment sciences involved, and in their application, the Court would
probably not have required procedural safeguards at the adjudication phase, because
the juvenile would not then be receiving "the worst of both worlds." But cf. Faust,
Implementing the Juvenile's Right to Receive Treatment, 6 CLEARINOHOUSE REVIEW
256 (1972). The second supporting case is Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 506 (1968), in
which the Court took a hard line realistic approach to the realities of the ineffective-
ness of treatment facilities and sciences regarding alcoholism, 392 U.S. at 527-29, and
concluded that the criminal sanction at the present time was the best alternative. See
also Salzman v. United States, 405 F.2d 358, 366 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright,
J., concurring) (before a disease may be a defense to a criminal charge, certain opera-
tive facts-the existence of treatment methods and facilities-must exist). Cf. Robin-
son v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
47. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1967). For a discus-
sion of what procedures must be followed in intra-institutional decision-making, see
Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. MacNeil, 434
F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Williams v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
This judicial position is the most compatible with the concept of a "right to treatment"
in helping to establish treatment as a right. But once established, the courts would "lay
back," and intervene only occasionally. This position then is in direct conflict with
the sound position-doubting the efficacy of the sciences-adopted by the Supreme
Court. See note 46 supra.
48. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
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can effectively be advanced. If these three assumptions are valid, then
there would be no theoretical difficulty with otherwise sound constitu-
tional arguments. If these assumptions cannot validly be made, then
the foundation on which the constitutional arguments depend would be
unsound.
The first assumption is that the present institutionally centered cor-
rectional system will continue. This assumption is reflected in the re-
liance upon due process 49 and cruel and unusual punishment" argu-
ments to establish the right. These arguments are based on concepts of
deprivations of liberty which presume that an institutional setting is pres-
ent." Although the juvenile correction system is presently centered
around institutions,52 there are strong indications that the trend is away
from confining juveniles in institutions and toward placing them in com-
munity-based programs. 3  One reason for this shift to community
49. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 27, 29-30 supra
and accompanying text for the companion equal protection arguments.
50. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
51. The due process and cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the Consti-
tution clearly apply to an institutional setting since one's liberty is so clearly cur-
tailed. These provisions obviously can be applied to noninstitutional settings as well.
As a practical matter, however, whatever boundaries are established by these constitu-
tional mandates rarely are exceeded in a noninstitutional setting. When they are
exceeded, the courts will intervene. Examples of overreaching noninstitutional action
are Wade v. Bethesda Hospital, 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (involuntary ster-
ilization had been ordered); In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767, 463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr.
375 (1970) (suspension of collegiate athletic activities ordered for marijuana user).
52. Nationally, sixty-seven percent of the funds and eighty-five percent of the per-
sonnel involved in juvenile corrections are allocated to institutions. TASK FORCE:
CORRECTIONS, supra note 13, at 5-6. The emphasis on institutions is also demonstrated
further by the realization that the massive percentage of funds and personnel allocated
to institutions is for only thirty-three percent of the juvenile offenders. Id. The cus-
todial emphasis can also be seen in an examination of detention facilities: custodial
personnel outnumber treatment and education personnel by five and one-half to one.
Id. at 120.
53. See, e.g., A. BREED, THE SINIFICANCE OF CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES TO THE
FIELD OF CORRECTIONS 2 (1966); R. McGEE & E. REIMER, THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT'S ROLE IN CORRECTIONS 13 (1966); TASK FORCE: CORRECTIONS, supra note 13,
at 38-44. 56-57 (1967); TASK FORCE: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 2, at 19-21,
41-56 (1967); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, U.S. TASK FORCE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
83-84, 165-79 (1967); S. WHEELER & L. COATRELL, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: ITS
PREVENTION AND CONTROL 4 (1966); TIME, July 24, 1972, at 54-56; St. Louis Post Dis-
patch, July 28, 1972, § C, at 3, col. 1.
For field reports on two programs, see CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY, Los ANGELES
COMMUNITY DELINQUENT CONTROL PROJECT: AN EXPERIMENT WiTIH REHABILITATION
IN THE URBAN COMMUNITY (1970); D. KNIGHT, THE MARSHALL PROGRAM: ASsESS-
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treatment programs is that institutional procedures have not been ef-
fective." Moreover, they cost more than a community-based program."
Another possible reason that the present institutional emphasis may
change is that a statutory scheme may require the primary juvenile dis-
position to be with parents in the community." Therefore, although
the underlying assumption that treatment will be set in an institutional
setting is presently correct, it may be invalid in the future."'
MENT OF A SHORT TEam INSTITUTIONAL PRoGRAM (1969). See also St. Louis Post
Dispatch, Feb. 16, 1972, § A, at 8, col. 1; id. April 21, 1972, § A, at 3, col. 4.
Several states have adopted Youth Authorities, which are designed to coordinate all
state activities for the handling of juveniles. See, e.g., TEx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
§ 5143(d) (1965). See also R. PERmIs, supra note 1, at 849-50. This development
does not necessarily mean a movement towards community treatment programs. In
fact, institutional dispositions may increase under a Youth Authority plan. See S.
RUBIN, CRimE AND JUvENmE DELINQUENCY 104-105 (1970).
For a discussion of the European trends, which appear to be away from institutions
generally, see J. CONRAD, TRENDs IN EURoP'N CORRECTIONS (1966). For the develop-
ment of community treatment programs in the mental health process, see BRAKEL, sUpra
note 10, at 8-13; St. Louis Post Dispatch, July 28, 1972, § D, at 4, col. 1.
54. Institutional treatment and rehabilitation has not proven to be very successful.
Recidivism rates run fifty percent and more. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1967); KENTUCKY COMM'N ON LAW ENFoRcEmENT AND CRIMB PREVENTION, DELIN-
QUENCY IN KENTUCKY 15 (1969); H. MACKAY, SUBSEQUENT ARRESTS, CONVICTIONS
AND CoMMrrmENTs AMONG FORMER DELINQUENTS (1966); TIME, July 24, 1972, at 54;
St. Louis Post Dispatch, Feb. 13, 1972, § IV, at 1, col. 1.
At the very least, the present institutional system is being misused. TASK FORCE:
CORRECTIONS, supra note 13, at 143, states:
In theory, training schools are specialized facilities for changing children rela-
tively hardened on delinquency. In practice, as the survey shows, they house
a nonselective population and are primarily used in ways which make the
serving of their theoretical purpose, that of "change," besides the point ...
[T~he effects of the diverse elements cited contribute to training facilities
wherein no one is best served and most are served in default.
Cf. Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 1289 (1966).
55. See TASK FORCE: CORRECTIONS, supra note 13, at 28, 38-42 (1967); TIME, July
24, 1972, at 54; St. Louis Post Dispatch, Feb. 13, 1972, § IV, at 1, col. 1.
56. For cases that indicate a strong judicial policy of placing the child with his
parents whenever possible rather than ordering institutionalization, see In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967); People v. Grieve, 131 Ill. App. 2d 1078, 267 N.E.2d 19 (1971);
In re Johnson, 30 Ill. App. 2d 439, 174 N.E.2d 907 (1961); In re Roberts, 13 Md.
App. 644, 284 A.2d 621 (1971); In re Walter, 172 N.W.2d 603 (N.D. 1969); Hill v.
State, 454 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1970). Examples of statutes reflecting a
similar policy: Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 211.011 (1969); STANDARD JUVENILE CT. ACT § 1
(1959). The Standard Juvenile Court Act is a proposed model statute prepared by the
National Council on Crime and Delinquency. The 1959 draft was the sixth revision.
57. It is probable that institutions will never be done away with entirely. When
Massachusetts recently closed down its juvenile institutions, which had housed about
1,100 juveniles, twenty juveniles were retained on the grounds of dangerousness. St.
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The second assumption is that the major purpose of juvenile institu-
tionalization is treatment. This is evident in arguments which assert
that the state has a moral obligation 5 to provide the treatment, and
that the substance of the law demands that treatment be provided.59
This assumption cannot validly be made. Although treatment goals
are avowed, juvenile commitments can serve other valid goals, such as
deterrence, retribution and incapacitation. 60 In fact, if a legislature
were to totally redraft commitment laws, basing them solely on the
youth's dangerousness to society, and excluding any treatment lan-
guage, an argument based on a substantive promise of treatment could
no longer be made. 61  It is clear that statutory references regarding
treatment for juveniles do not have to be made at all.62 Additionally,
in light of the present juvenile court practice, the assumption that ju-
venile commitments are oriented towards treatment is probably Mu-
sory.6
3
Louis Post Dispatch, Feb. 13, 1972, § IV, at 1, col. 1. But if clearly authorized by
statute, juveniles could be confined solely on the grounds of dangerousness to the public.
See In re W., 5 Cal. 2d 296, 302, 486 P.2d 1201, 1206, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1971);
Barnes v. Director of Patuxent, 240 Md. 32, 212 A.2d 465 (1965). This would
negative notions of the state's obligations to provide treatment.
58. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
59. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
60. See F. ALLEN, BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JusTicE 51-53 (1964); H. Lou, JuvE-
NILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 144 (1927); Antiean, Constitutional Rights in Juve-
nile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387, 388-90 (1961). See also Burger, No Man Is An
Island. 56 A.B.A.J. 325, 326 (1970): "Even when we profess rehabilitation and correc-
tion as objectives, we probably know that to all of us some of the time and some of us
all of the time punishment and retribution are factors."
61. See the "law of the land theory" discussion, infra at notes 75-76 and accom-
panying text. See also Note, Civil Commitments of the Mentally Ill, Theories and
Procedures, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1288, 1289-95 (1966), for a discussion of the various
rationales of civil commitments.
62. Statutes could be drafted to authorize confinement solely on the grounds of
dangerousness to the public or to the individual himself. See In re W., 5 Cal. 2d 296,
302, 486 P.2d 1201, 1206, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1971); Barnes v. Director of Patuxent,
240 Md. 32, 212 A.2d 465 (1965).
63. There are three facts that support this proposition. First, juvenile institutions
are understaffed in treatment and educational personnel. TASK FORCE: CORRECTIONS,
supra note 13, at 145; St. Louis Post Dispatch, March 12, 1972, § C, at 12, col. 1.
It would be astounding if juvenile judges professed ignorance of this shortage. And
since commitments of juveniles to institutions still continue, even though institutions
are understaffed, misused and ineffective, one can conclude that the treatment objec-
tive is not primary. Second, the average stay in a juvenile institution averages only
nine months or less. TASK FORCE: CORRECrlONS, supra note 13, at 144. See United
States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973, 976 (D.D.C. 1971). This indicates that little
substantial treatment occurs. At best, institutional stays are designed for their "shock
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The third assumption is that the parens patriae philosophy will re-
main the theme of the juvenile system: If treatment were a right, the
state would be able to decide which treatment is appropriate. There
are two indications, however, that the parens patriae philosophy will
not remain the basic theme underlying the juvenile justice system:
first, recent Supreme Court decisions, although limited to the adjudica-
tion phase, have severely undercut the doctrine's viability;14 and sec-
ondly, recent legislative activity calls for processing juveniles in a man-
ner similar to adult offenders. 65
Because these three assumptions, which are necessary to support a
right to institutional treatment, are not sustainable, there is not a suffi-
cient foundation for the constitutional arguments. The upshot of this
assessment is obvious: without institutions, any argument for a right to
institutional treatment would be rendered moot; and, similarly, without
treatment and without some concept such as parens patriae, arguments
for a right to institutional treatment would be mooted. Therefore,
without institutions, without treatment as the legislative goal and with-
out parens patriae, there cannot be a right to institutional treatment.
Only if all these assumptions are ignored or assessed as viable 0 could
value," which means such sentences serve a deterence function. Third, the experience
of St. Louis also supports this assertion. Juvenile Judge Gary Gaertner advocates a
tough line approach, which places a heavy reliance on institutions and detention centers.
See St. Louis Post Dispatch, Feb. 13, 1972, § A, at 30, col. 1; id., March 26, 1972,
§ A, at 8, col. 1; id., March 26, 1972, § A, at 8, col. 1; id., Sept. 8, 1972, § A, at 4,
col. 1. See also id., March 21, 1972, § C, at 2, col. 3, in which the following editorial
appeared:
The whole approach of the new judge seems to be to fit tough punishment to
the gravity of the offense rather than to follow the modem juvenile justice
philosophy of trying to prevent further delinquency by removing youthful
offenders from the family and social conditions which led to a run-in with
the law. The most deplorable aspect of Judge Gaertner's approach is that it
has already been tried and found ineffective.
64. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-21 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
555-56 (1966). Accord, In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 610, 109 A.2d 523, 528 (1951)
(Musamanno, J., dissenting). The continuing viability of parens patriae can be ques-
tioned because it has been proven to be in practice not at all like the theory (see
notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text) envisioned it to be. Moreover, Mr. Justice
Fortas, in Gault, questioned how and why this doctrine was even incorporated into the
juvenile justice system. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
65. See Speca & White, Variations and Trends in Proposed Legislation on Iuvenile
Courts, 40 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 129, 168-69 (1972); St. Louis Post Dispatch, March 10,
1972, § C, at 1, col. 5.
66. These three underlying assumptions, if approached differently, could be viewed
as valid. For instance, it can be argued that, whatever may happen in the future,
institutions are part of the correctional process today, and that the right to institutional
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there be a sufficient foundation upon which to press constitutional ar-
guments.
C. The Constitution and the Arguments for a Right to Treatment
The next inquiry is whether, in light of the assumptions discussed
above, the constitutional arguments which can be advanced for institu-
tional treatment are sound. One due process 67 and one equal protec-
tiont" argument stress that treatment must be provided to juveniles
because they receive less than the full procedural safeguards afforded
in other commitment systems.69 The weakness of these arguments in
the juvenile context is that they ignore recent Supreme Court cases
which hold that the standard for judging procedures at the adjudication
treatment is a present right. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir.
19661. It can further be argued that institutions will probably remain if only to house
those dangerous to society, and that those institutionalized would still be entitled to a
right to institutional treatment. The second assumption that is made, that treat-
ment is the purpose of the juvenile court acts, is harder to justify as viable. One
could argue that the legislatures may redraft statutes to provide explicitly for a right to
treatment. But if a legislature redrafted the laws, funded treatment efforts, and de-
fined the scope of judicial review, it could settle for that state the issue whether there is
an inherent constitutional right to treatment. See note 75-76 infra and accompanying
text. Support for the proposition of parens patriae can be found in one interpretation of
Gault. The Court's attack, since it was limited to the adjudication stage, left un-
touched the correctional process. Further, the Court's citation in footnote 30 of the
'right to treatment" cases implies that the Court views those decisions favorably.
Also, one could draw additional support from McKeiver, which has language which
indicates a hope for rehabilitation. For a case that uses Gault and especially McKeiver
in this fashion, see Inmates of Boy's Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354
(D.R.I. 1972).
67. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
68. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
69. Some courts have held Rouse to be inapplicable to proceedings other than
mandatory involuntary hospitalization under criminal statutes. State v. Pooley, 278
Minn. 67, 153 N.W.2d 143 (1967) (Rouse inapplicable to one actually convicted of
commission of a crime); In re Jones, 433 Pa. 44, 60, 246 A.2d 356, 365 (1968). Cf.
Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (en bane) (Burger, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that courts may have authority to examine only conditions of
civil commitments, not the Rouse situation.) In the juvenile context, therefore, there
is the initial issue as to the classification of juvenile dispositional proceedings as either
"criminal" or "civil." With In re Gault, the Court indicated that mere labels would
not control such a determination, but rather the nature of the proceeding. If Gault
is read to make juvenile proceedings truly "criminal," Rouse may not be applicable.
However, Gault and McKeiver could be read to limit the "criminal" label to only the
adjudicatory stage, hence leaving disposition a "civil" matter, and nevertheless, Rouse
may still not apply. However, the proposition for treatment as a right for juveniles can
be advanced in general terms that it must be provided in exchange for procedural guar-
antees, whether judged by the civil or criminal safeguards. Cf. note 24 supra.
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stage is "fundamental fairness. ' 0 It does not follow that there are cor-
responding treatment rights merely because use of a fundamental fair-
ness standard allows less than the full panoply of procedural criminal
safeguards. 71  The second due process argument 72 is that to institution-
alize a juvenile without treatment deprives him of the substantive prom-
ise of treatment that is implicit in the statutes. The success of this argu-
ment will depend on a court's willingness 73 to construe unclear lan-
guage74 in an unequivocal way. If a court was willing to find that the
legislature intended to require treatment, and if that court accepted Mr.
Justice Black's "Law of the Land" theory76 that to deprive a person of a
statutory right once a statute clearly establishes that right violates
due process of law, 76 only then would there be a due process right to
70. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 65, 72 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
71. See United States ex rel. Murray v. Owens, 465 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972)
(upholding commitment of a fifteen year old juvenile without jury trial to an adult
prison on theory that no special treatment rights are required because the juvenile re-
ceives other benefits, e.g., trial without delay, by being handled as an adult). Courts
could similarly stress the special juvenile rights, such as confidentiality and no per-
manent automatic loss of civil rights rather than treatment, as what juveniles receive
for being accorded less than the full criminal safeguards. But see Inmates of Boys'
Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972); Ketcham, supra note 2,
at 100-01. See also Note, The Court, The Constitution and Juvenile Institutional Re-
form, 52 B.U.L. REv. 33, 36-37 (1972), in which the author argues that the logic of
In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d 266 (1966), requires a trade-off: the "social com-
pact" made for the special handling of juveniles in exchange for some constitutional
rights requires that the courts provide other rights, such as the right to treatment.
72. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
73. Cf. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
74. Two writers have cited the same eleven statutes to illustrate a legislative in-
tention of a right to treatment. See Kittrie, supra note 11, at 862 n.62 (1969);
Comment, Juvenile Law-An Important Step Toward Recognition of the Constitutional
Right to Treatment, 16 ST. Louis U.LJ. 340, 344 n.8 (1972). As recognized by these
authors, these statutes apply to a right to humane care and treatment for the mentally
ill. See note 22 supra. These statutes do not apply to support a right to institutional
treatment for juveniles in the juvenile correctional process. This is because state
statutes provide for mentally disturbed juveniles to be diverted from the juvenile
correctional process to the mental health process. See, e.g., Aiuz. STAT. ANN. § 8-242
(1970); CAL. WELF. AN INsT'NS CODE §§ 703-705 (Deering 1966); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 211.201 (1969). If no such statute existed, however, then an argument could be ad-
vanced that these human care and treatment provisions do apply within the juvenile
process to those juveniles who are mentally ill. However, the weakness of the argument
is that a mentally ill juvenile would be handled as a mentally ill person, not specifically
as a juvenile. Cf. Donovan, The Juvenile Courts and The Mentally Disabled Juvenile,
16 N.D.L. REv. 222 (1968).
75. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
76. In Griffin, the Court also found a violation of equal protection. An unsettled
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treatment. The third due process argument 77 is simply that the state
ought to provide treatment. The weakness of this proposition is that
such matters are usually left to legislative discretion.-"
One equal protection argument79 is that the justification for allowing
statutes to authorize longer periods of incarceration for juveniles than
for adults who commit the same offense is that treatment is provided
to juveniles.80  The cases dealing with this argument conflict. Some
language in these cases indicates that if a juvenile is incarcerated with-
out treatment there could be no justification for longer sentences.81
However, longer detentions could be justified under the equal protec-
tion clause if the juvenile is to receive treatment, 2 if the juvenile court
act is rehabilitative in nature,83 or if the juvenile is capable of being
rehabilitated."' Reliance on equal protection, however, cannot be car-
issue of Griffin is whether a subsequent repeal of the statute from which the constitu-
tional right sprang would undermine the constitutional basis for that right. If the leg-
islature could undo the constitutional right by merely repealing the statute, the strength
of any due process argument which is based on statutes and their construction is
severely diluted by this practical limitation.
77. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
78. In re Jones, 432 Pa. 44, 60, 246 A.2d 356, 364 (1968).
79. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
80, See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967). Gault faced the possibility of six years
in confinement whereas an adult who had committed the same offense would have
faced a maximum of two months and a fine of five to fifty dollars. However, the
actual average stay of the juvenile is relatively short. United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F.
Supp. 973, 976 (D.D.C. 1971); TAsK FORCE: CORRECTIONS, supra note 13, at 144.
81. See Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972) (male and female offenders
must be accorded similar handling); In re Wilson, 138 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614 (1970)
(violation of due process if longer sentences for juveniles when juveniles and adults
contained in the same institution); In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d 266 (1966)
("The validity of the whole juvenile system is dependent upon its adherence to its
protective rather than its punitive aspects.").
82. In re Wilson, 438 Pa. 425, 432, 264 A.2d 614, 618 (1970).
83. See Harvin v. United States, 445 F.2d 675, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en bane)
(Tamm, J., concurring and dissenting) (upholding the use of indeterminate sentences
as useful for rehabilitation); Rawls v. United States, 331 F.2d 21, 27 (8th Cir. 1964);
Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962); State v. Pinkerton,
186 Neb. 225, 182 N.W.2d 199 (1970); Smith v. State, 441 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1969).
84. People ex rel. Thompson v. Noble, 231 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (re-
buttable presumption of being amenable to treatment); State v. Pitt, 28 Conn. Supp. 137,
140, 253 A.2d 671, 673 (Sup. Ct. 1969); People ex rel. Meltsner v. Follette, 32 App.
Div. 2d 389, 390-91, 302 N.Y.S.2d 624, 625-26 (1969). See also People ex rel. Meyer
v. Follette, 254 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (court found no difficulty in transferring
those who fail to respond to rehabilitation from a reformatory to prison).
Another possible basis for distinguishing among classification of juveniles and the
length of their detention is whether the juvenile needs to remain for a long or short
175
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tied further than that point. The thrust of equal protection does not
force the state to provide treatment; rather it requires that the state
make institutional placements which are not disparate without substan-
tial rational justifications. A second equal protection argument""
made in the mental health context is that indiscriminate intermixing of
incarcerated juveniles would deprive each juvenile of the opportunity
to receive individualized treatment. This argument, however, is not
applicable to the juvenile correctional process for several reasons.
First, the premise of individualized treatment stems from the initial rea-
son for institutionalization. Unlike the mental health area, in which
there are several classifications 8 of commitment schemes, juveniles are
all sentenced under the same statutory scheme.8 7  This difference un-
dermines the premise of individualized treatment. Secondly, because
impermissible intermixing can only occur in an institution, the validity
of this equal protection argument depends on the continued use of the
institutions, which is an unsustainable assumption. 8 Thirdly, even if
the proposition of individualized treatment and of a ban on intermixing
were sound, an application of equal protection to a situation in which
impermissible intermixing was occurring would require only an end to
that intermixing, not the provision of treatment. The third equal pro-
tection argument is a combination of the fundamental personal inter-
ests cases and wealth cases.89 The argument is that an individual's en-
term. See Maratella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), citing Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). Such a classification scheme, which presupposes
treatment, would not violate the equal protection clause.
85. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text. The prevention of intermixing
of juveniles with adult offenders is an approved practice. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28
(1967); Guy v. Ciccone, 439 F.2d 400, 402-03 (8th Ch'. 1971) (Bright, J., con-
curring); In re F., 69 Misc. 2d 932, 934, 331 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (Fam. Ct. 1971);
In re Tsesmiles, 24 Ohio App. 2d 153, 156, 265 N.E.2d 308, 310 (1971). Cf. Vann v.
Scott, 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972) (no violation of equal protection by grouping
juvenile runaways with other juveniles who had committed crimes).
86. Some of the classifications include: not guilty by reason of insanity; incompe.
tent to stand trial; mental defective; defective delinquent; and sexual psychopath.
87. But as a juvenile commitment scheme becomes differentiated among juveniles
in need of supervision, neglected, dependent and delinquent children, one could argue
that the premise of individualized treatment would be applicable to the juvenile process.
Also supporting this interpretation is United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973
(D.D.C. 1971), which, if it became the dominant rule, would require dispositions based
on psychological classifications. Cf. State v. Fisher, 17 Ohio App. 2d 183, 245 N.E.2d
358 (1969). See generally Pryer, The Juvenile's Right to Receive Treatment, 6 FAMILY
L.Q. 279, 301-06 (1972).
88. See notes 51-57 supra and accompanying text.
89. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/10
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joyment of a fundamental interest, a "child's fair start in life,"9 ° cannot
be discriminated against by state statute, and that the state would be
obligated to provide to all children the equivalent "fair start," including
"treatment," which wealthy people could offer their children.9 The
first constitutional difficulty with this argument is whether a "fair start
in life" qualifies as a fundamental interest. Although the fundamental
interest cases are hard to classify, they all arose out of a state statutory
scheme which denied the right in issue. Even assuming a fair start is
a fundamental interest, it is difficult to imagine a state statutory scheme
that would put "a child's fair start" into precise focus.92 The second
difficulty with this argument is that state discrimination against a per-
sonal fundamental interest would be more difficult to establish in the
case of treatment than it has been in the other fundamental interests
cases. This is because the mere disproportionate handling of ghetto
youths, for instance, would not be the same as discrimination which ap-
pears on the face of the statute. Finally, this argument suffers from
the simplistic delusion that such a fundamental interest could be ad-
ministered, let alone be defined.
The first argument based on the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the eighth amendment stems from Robinson v. California,93
and suggests that confinement for a status or condition without treatment
amounts to punishment. Thus, juveniles could not constitutionally
be imprisoned without treatment.9" The argument's weakness is
that it assumes that delinquency is a status or condition similar to men-
tal illness, drug addiction or other medical afflictions. This conception
of juvenile delinquency as a status, although possibly applicable to in-
90. Bazelon, Racism, Classism, and the Juvenile Process, 63 JUDICATURE 373, 378
(1970): "It is difficult to imagine what more basic right there could be than a
child'- fair start in life."
91. Cf. Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1968). But cf.
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc).
92. A different version of the fundamental interest argument is conceivable. Ra-
ther than approaching the issue as whether there is a right to treatment, one could argue
that once a juvenile is committed for any treatment-related purpose, that juvenile
would have a fundamental interest in that treatment. This argument is different in two
respects. First, the fundamental personal interest would be in the treatment itself, not
the right to have treatment. Secondly, this argument would depend on a twist of the
normal fundamental interest concept and on the constitutional recognition of treatment,
which then runs to the individual, whereas the other fundamental interest cases seem to
be that an individual has a fundamental personal interest, which then is said to be of
constitutional magnitude.
93. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
94. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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dividual juveniles, cannot be applied to juveniles as a class.' The
second argument based on the eighth amendment, 0 and perhaps the
strongest, is that indeterminate confinement without treatment of those
not criminally responsible is itself a violation of the eighth amendment.
Juveniles can be said to qualify as those not criminally responsible be-
cause the goal of the original juvenile court acts was partially to absolve
juveniles of criminal responsibility. 97 The weakness of this proposition
lies not in the argument, but rather in the practical limitations of the
eighth amendment itself. That constitutional provision was designed
to curtail the use of certain practices-its thrust being essentially nega-
tive. It has not been applied positively; that is, as a means to imple-
ment radically new treatment programs.
D. The Right to Treatment and the Courts
If the courts were to adjudicate a constitutional right to treatment, it
would have a tremendous impact on the juvenile justice process. The
initial question is at which stages of detention" and institutionalization
would it apply. It would clearly be applicable to the post-adjudication
institutional placement, for that is the stage where the treatment and re-
habilitation of the youth supposedly occurs.99 However, the applica-
95. See Note, The Courts, The Constitution and Juvenile Institutional Reform,
52 B.U.L. REV. 35, 45-46 (1972). But cf. United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973,
976 (D.D.C. 1971) (court noted that eighty percent of the juveniles institutionalized had
some sort of drug problem). If that phenomenon were universally true, then the
validity of a Robinson-based defense would appear to be applicable. However, the
practical upshot of such an argument is that the state might choose not to institutional-
ize such youths, which would deprive them of treatment, or the state could commit
youths on the grounds of dangerousness.
96. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
97. See S. Fox, Thm JUVENILE CouRTs: ITS CONTENT, PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNI-
TIES, 11-13 (1966); Pryer, The Juvenile's Right to Receive Treatment, 6 FAMILY L.Q.
279, 291 (1972).
Pryer has even advanced an argument for a right to treatment based on the ninth
amendment: Since parens patriae has "traditionally been supported by law, religion,
morality and custom, it can be argued that the Ninth Amendment forbids the state to
deprive the delinquent of his family life if it then fails to provide the juvenile with the
same adequate care, custody and protection which the child had a right to demand
from his parents." Pryer, supra at 315.
98. Detention is defined as the "practice of holding children of juvenile court age
for court disposition." TAsK: FORCE: CoRRECnONS, supra note 13, at 119. Another
type of detention is "shelter care," which is used in neglect and dependency cases. Id.
99. See In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also Clayton v. Stone,
358 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring); Elmore v. Stone, 355 F.2d
841 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
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bility of the right under the various justifications for detention is less
clear. 0" Detention may be authorized for several reasons: 10 1  (1)
protection of the juvenile and/or the community; (2) psychiatric ob-
servation and diagnosis; (3) guaranteeing appearance at adjudication;
and (4) compensating for the lack of a suitable home environment.
One could argue for the application of the right to treatment at the de-
tention stage under any of these justifications on the ground that the
juvenile is "affected" from the moment juvenile court jurisdiction is
assumed and that, therefore, treatment is required to begin at this time
to prevent adverse affects. 10 2  This reasoning is not acceptable, how-
ever, because it alters the definition of treatment, 1 3 and ignores the
realities of detention. 04 Therefore, the crucial issue in determining
to which type of detention the right would be applicable depends upon
its duration and the real purposes of detention. Generally, the shorter
the detention, the less compelling the need to apply the right, since the
purpose of the shorter detention is primarily the physical retention of
the child.'", The longer the period of incarceration, the more reason
100 But see Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967), in which the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia indicated that it would hear substantial complaints
as to the adequacy of the care during an interim period of detention. The court
stated that when presented with a substantial complaint, such as the denial of needed
psychiatric care, the court should inquire whether the statutory criteria regarding de-
tention facilities have been met.
101. See generally TASK FORCE: CoRREcrroNs, supra note 13, at 119-30; Mora,
Juvenile Detention: A Constitutional Problem Affecting Local Government, 1 URBAN
L w. 189 (1969); Schmidt, The Juvenile Court--Salvation or Damnation For Youthful
Offenders, 41 MIcH. Sr. BAR. J. 24, 27 (1962). For a collection of statutes dealing
with pre-trial detentions, see Note, The Right to Bail and the Pre-"Trial" Detention of
Juveniles Accused of Crime, 18 VAND. L. Rnv. 2096 (1965). Some of these detention
statutes are drafted to authorize emergency detentions for the well-being of the child.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.10.123 (1962).
102. Gough, supra note 11, at 194.
103. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
104. See Mora, supra note 101, at 190-202. Despite standards against such prac-
tices, in ninety-three percent of the juvenile court jurisdictions the only facility for
juvenile detention is the local jail, some of which are not even deemed suitable for
federal adult prisoners. Less than half of the detention centers have psychiatric person-
nel available. TASK FORCE: CoRREcTroNs, supra note 13, at 122. But when psychiatric
help is extensively provided, the effective counseling is minimal and is used to "cover up"
the custodial function. See Mora, supra note 101, at 196. See also St. Louis Post Dis-
patch, June 15, 1972, § A, at 2, col. 1, detailing the overcrowded conditions at the
St. Louis detention facility: the detention center population, although designed for
eighty, was housing one hundred fifty-six juveniles. Some of the juveniles were de-
tained for as long as eight months.
105. Cf. Mora, supra note 101, at 196-97.
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there would be to apply the right. It would seem that the right
would apply to detention for psychiatric observation and diagnosis, 00
because such a detention marks the beginning of the actual treatment
process.
The impact on the courts of a right to institutional treatment would
be seen in three areas-selection of a dispositional alternative, judicial
supervision of institutions, and the nature of judicial review. If there
were a right to institutional treatment, a court, in selecting an appro-
priate disposition, would be required to explore all possible sentencing
alternatives,10 7 to prevent misclassification of juveniles, 10 8 to rely on
106. See United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971); In re Curry,
452 F.2d 1360, 1363 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1971): "The overall therapeutic process-which
begins with observation and diagnosis to determine whether treatment is required-
must be initiated as soon as the period of involuntary hospitalization begins." Cf.
United Commercial Travelers v. Shane, 64 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1933); Stephens v. Williams,
226 Ala. 534, 147 So. 608 (1933); Lutman v. American Shoe Machine Co., 155 S.W.2d
701 (Mo. App. 1941), for cases including diagnosis within the definition of treat-
ment for insurance liability purposes.
In United States v. Alsbrook, supra, the court held that under the Federal Youth
Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(e) (1969), immediate steps must be taken to pro-
vide space for the observation of juveniles who may be amenable to treatment, but
were being handled as adults due to the lack of facilities. The court ordered more
facilities to be utilized for psychiatric observation and diagnosis. 336 F. Supp. at
978-83. The Alsbrook result was prompted by United States v. Waters, 437 F.2d 722
(D.C. Cir. 1970), where the court construed the sentencing scheme in the Federal
Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (1969), to require that 18-22 year olds be
found incorrigible or unamenable to treatment efforts before they can be sentenced as
"adults" (those over 26). 437 F.2d at 727. The Waters court also concluded that
it was the congressional intent to establish the priority in sentencing of achieving re-
habilitation. 437 F.2d at 726. Accord, United States v. Ward, 454 F.2d 992 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
Contra, United States v. Lowrey, 335 F. Supp. 519 (D.D.C. 1971), decided just
ten days after Alsbrook, in which another District of Columbia judge rejected the
Alsbrook sentencing guidelines (see note 109 infra) and procedures as unnecessary and
unreasonable. 335 F. Supp. at 521-23. See Mora, supra note 101, at 193-97, where it
is argued that treatment ought not to be applied during detention because the selection
process cannot be accurate, treatment cannot be administered or achieved, the staffs
of juvenile courts are not properly trained, and the time involved is very short.
107. See In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d
106 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Accord, Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(en banc). Cf. Wade v. Bethesda Hospital, 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (juve-
nile judge liable under a § 1983 action for exceeding his authority in ordering the
sterilization of feeble-minded juvenile); In re Smith, 12 CRiM. L. REP. 2061 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. Sept. 22, 1972) (juvenile court without authority to order sixteen year old
girl to obtain an abortion because the girl's mother wished her daughter to terminate the
pregnancy).
108. See Gough, supra note 11, at 194-95.
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psychiatric diagnoses'0 9 and to avoid a routine use of waiver to the
criminal process."10 The courts would also be required to decide
whether the original institutionalization was improper,"' whether to re-
lease those who are not receiving treatment," 2 whether the institution
has sufficiently provided the needed treatment to allow the state to col-
lect support costs from the parents, 1' 3 and whether to order specific
109. In United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973, 979-80 (D.D.C. 1971), dis-
cussed in note 106 supra, Judge Gesell established new sentencing guidelines to deter-
mine whether a youth offender is amenable to treatment under the Federal Youth Cor-
rections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (1969):
( I) No defendant shall be so committed under the Youth Corrections Act
without a 5010(e) study.
(2) In the event that the study indicates that the correction authorities
consider the defendant amenable to final commitment under the Youth Cor-
rections Act, the Court shall require as part of the 5010(e) report a precise
statement by the correction authorities of the plan of treatment and the ap-
pro\imate time it is contemplated that the defendant will be in custody before
release to a half-way house, including goals that will be set for him prior to
release.
(3) No defendant shall be committed under the Youth Corrections Act un-
less the Attorney General certifies in advance as to each defendant that a
facility is available to provide the type of program and adequate period of
treatment contemplated in the particular 5010(e) report.
(4) Under appropriate circumstances, the Court shall commit all offenders
under U.S. Code offenses for 5010(e) studies and ultimate incarceration
at other Youth Centers around the country.
Needless to say, such a procedure places a tremendous burden on the correctional
official, as well as the court. For a criticism of those procedures, see United States
v. Lowrey, 335 F. Supp. 519, 521-23 (D.D.C. 1971).
110, SLc Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (a waiver of
juvenile court jurisdiction based solely on a letter and telephone call held improper); cf.
United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973, 976 (D.D.C. 1971) (court critical that
forty-three "treatable" juveniles had been handled as adults because sufficient facilities
not asvailable). In Haziel Judge Bazelon indicated that the juvenile court's assertion that
"there are no reasonable prospects of rehabilitating the juvenile by the use of facilities
presently available to the Juvenile Court" was an inadequate inquiry into dispositional
alternatives and an insufficient grounds for waiver. The court in dictum stated that it
xsould not "ignore the mockery of a benevolent statute unbacked by adequate facilities."
404 F.2d at 1280.
Ill. See In re E.M.D., 490 P.2d 658 (Alas. 1971) (a child in need of supervision
may not be placed in a juvenile institution); In re P. (anonymous), 34 App. Div. 2d
(61, 310 N.Y.S.2d 124 (1970) (institutionalization was not proper when the juvenile
was diagnosed as a "bad risk" for institutionalization); In re Braun, 145 N.W.2d 482
(N.D. 1966) (a pregnant unwed girl should not have been institutionalized when there
were no facilities for child care and when the child's father wished to marry the girl).
112. See In re I., 64 Misc. 2d 878, 316 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Fain. Ct. 1970) (committing
court ordered release of a fifteen year old girl in need of supervision when the institu-
tion refused to provide psychiatric care). For a discussion of the use of the technique
of release, see note 121 infra and accompanying text
113. See Adoptive Parents v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 438, 466 P.2d 732 (1970)
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treatment when needed." 4  Finally, the right to treatment would af-
fect institutions, which would have to be designed to provide treatment
and which would be required to provide it in fact.115 Courts would
(parents not liable for costs when the state failed to provide the child with needed
psychiatric care); cf. Ginn v. Superior Court, 3 Ariz. App. 240, 413 P.2d 571 (1966)
(upholding an assessment for support). Ginn and Adoptive Parents were decided un-
der a statute similar to the current Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-243 (Supp. 1972):
If a child is to be awarded or committed to the state department of correc-
tions or other state department or institution, the juvenile court shall inquire
into the ability of the child, his estate or parent, guardian or person who has
custody of such child to bear the charge, expense and maintenance of such
child while committed to the custody of the state department of corrections or
other public or private institution or agency, or private person or persons.
If the court is satisfied that the child, his estate or parent, guardian or person
who has custody of such child can bear such charges, expense and mainte-
nance or any portion of them, the juvenile court shall fix the amount thereof
and direct that the child, his estate or parent, guardian or person who has cus-
tody of such child pay such amount monthly to the state department of cor-
rections or other public or private institution or agency, or private person or
persons to which the child is awarded or committed. The state department
of corrections or other public or private institution or agency, or private per-
son or persons shall acknowledge the receipt of the money received to the
person paying the same. The state department of corrections or other state
institution or agency shall transmit such money as it receives monthly to the
state treasurer to be deposited in the state general fund. The juvenile court
shall transmit a copy of its orders concerning payment along with its order of
commitment.
For a collection of statutes providing for cost sharing in the mental health process,
see BRAKEL, supra note 10, at 129-32. But cf. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirch-
ner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964) (constitutionality of
such acts questioned). In Kirchner the California Supreme Court held that the
California statute constituted an arbitrary assessment against one class and hence vio-
lated equal protection. The United States Supreme Court vacated, 380 U.S. 194
(1965), but the original decision was reaffirmed, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43
Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965).
114. The willingness of courts to actually order treatment has to date been very
limited. An Illinois juvenile court held that the 430-day confinement of a sixteen year
old deaf-mute boy without treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment and
violated due process. The court ordered that either treatment be provided at the insti-
tution or the youth be transported to a special school. In re Harris, 2 CaIM. L. RFP.
2412 (Cook County Juv. Ct. Dec. 22, 1967). In Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106, 110
(D.C. Cir. 1967), the court noted in dictum that the lower courts have the power to
order hospital or psychiatric care in appropriate cases. In re Owens, 9 C~aM. L. Rap.
2415 (Cook County Cir. Ct. July 9, 1971), required that counseling be given after any
stay in solitary confinement exceeding five days in length and after injections of
tranquilizing medication. In re Savoy, No. 70-4808 (D.C. Juv. Ct., Oct. 13, 1970)
ordered that the District of Columbia detention home end overcrowding, provide addi-
tional reading materials, reshape the recreation program, and provide a more equal
educational program.
115. Harvin v. United States, 445 F.2d 675, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Tamm, J., con-
curring and dissenting). The court in Harvin faced the issue of whether a nineteen
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have to review the conditions of confinement," 6 the appropriateness of
certain "treatment" practices,'" 7 and control administrative transfers of
juveniles to adult prisons."l s
year old convicted by a bench trial on an information for a misdemeanor could be
sentenced for six years under the Federal Youth Corrections Act. In responding af-
firmatively, the court found one justification to be that a FYCA sentence was to be
served in "an institution where the confinement is consistent with the purposes of the
Act to afford treatment and rehabilitation." 445 F.2d at 682. However, the dis-
senting judges would interpret the Act's definition of treatment, in 18 U.S.C. 5006(a)
(1969), which provides that "treatment means corrective and preventive guidance and
training designed to protect the public by correcting the anti-social tendencies of youth
offenders," to require that a sentence under the FYCA to an institution "must not only
be designed for treatment and rehabilitation, it must in fact provide these benefits."
Id. at 693 (emphasis original). The dissenters thought it important to define "treat-
ment" in a precise manner when "defining the parameters of a constitutional right."
Id.
If an institution failed to provide in fact the needed treatment, and if treatment be-
comes a constitutional right, then courts may be forced to close the institution. This
is the thrust of Maratella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), in which the
court found a center for housing girls to be maintained in violation of the eighth
amendment and ordered the institution closed.
116. Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972);
In re Savoy, No. 70-4808 (D.C. Juv. Ct., Oct. 13, 1970) (District of Columbia
receiving home an unsuitable place of detention); Juvenile Detention Center-Baltimore
City Jail, CCH Pov. L. REP. 13,641 (Supreme Bench of Baltimore City Aug. 3, 1971)
(conditions of detention so "miserable" as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment,
conditions ordered improved; ordered that facility not be used as a place of juvenile
detention after August 2, 1972); Stockton v. Alabama Industrial School for Negro
Children, Civil No. 2834-N (M.D. Ala., filed July 23, 1971).
There are two approaches other than constitutionally based arguments which
have been used to correct the conditions of prison. Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6
(ist Cir. 1972) (alleging an unintentional failure to provide prison inmates with heat
states a § 1983 claim); Harris v. Fitzpatrick, 11 CRim. L. REP. 2279 (Wayne County,
Mich., Cir. Ct. May 18, 1972) (minimum housing code standards applicable to the
local jail).
117. Lollis v. Social Services, 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Owens, 9
CRIM. L. REP. 2415 (Cook County Juv. Ct. July 9, 1971). In Lolis, the court held that
the confinement of a fourteen year old girl in an isolated strip cell for two weeks for
fighting while at training school was cruel and unusual punishment. The court ordered
her release and further ordered the defendants to submit to the court proposed stand-
ards relating to future use of isolation cells. 322 F. Supp. at 483. For other cases
dealing with the use of solitary confinement and strip cells in prisons, see Sostre v.
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), noted 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 347; Davis v. Lindsay,
321 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257
F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966). The court in Owens placed limits on the use of soli-
tary confinement and tranquilizers.
118. Some courts have already reached the conclusion that such administrative trans-
fers of juveniles are prohibited on the general theory that such transfers are incom-
patible with the goals of treatment and rehabilitation. Huff v. O'Bryant, 121 F.2d 890Washington University Open Scholarship
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If the courts declare that a constitutional right to treatment exists,
numerous practical difficulties may be encountered. A severe limita-
tion on any implementation of this right is the inability of courts to as-
sure adequate funding.11 If courts order large-scale, expensive insti-
tutional treatment, effective funding would have to be provided; other-
wise the mandate would be meaningless. 120  The court's primary
(D.C. Cir. 1941); Kauter v. Reid, 183 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1960); United States v.
Hegstrom, 178 F. Supp. 17 (D. Conn. 1959); White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C.
1953); In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d 266 (1966). Other courts have prohibited such
administrative institutional transfers by another means. These courts reason that,
since no statutory authority exists for such administrative transfers, they cannot be
made. Cruz v. State Department of Corrections, 8 Ariz. App. 349, 446 P.2d 253
(1968); Boone v. Danforth, 463 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. 1971); State ex rel. Edwards v.
McCauley, 50 Wis. 2d 597, 184 N.W.2d 908 (1971). Other cases, however, have
upheld the validity of such transfers. Sonneberg v. Markeley, 289 F.2d 126 (7th Cir.
1961); Arkadiele v. Markeley, 186 F. Supp. 586 (S.D. Ind. 1960); Wilson v. Coughlin,
259 Iowa 113, 147 N.W.2d 175 (1966); Brown v. State, 274 A.2d 717 (Me. 1971);
Shone v. State, 237 A.2d 412 (Me. 1968). See generally Pryer, The Juvenile's Right to
Receive Treatment, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 279, 286-93 (1972).
See also Patterson v. Hopkins, 350 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (restrictive use
of the town's adult jail as a substitute juvenile detention center approved).
It is informative to look at the actual results of the leading right to treatment cases-
Rouse v. Cameron, Creek v. Stone, In re Elmore and Wyatt v. Stickney. It is obvious
that, despite their sweeping language, their practical impact has been minimal. After a
remand to the trial court, Rouse was again reheard by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court. Rouse v. Cameron, 387 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (en banc). Once again
the court ordered the case remanded after a finding that the petitioner did not ac-
quiesce in his insanity defense. Meanwhile, during all these appeals, Rouse remained
in St. Elizabeths Hospital. Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger has referred to the land-
mark (first) Rouse case as "entirely dictum." Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519,
525 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (en banc) (Burger, J., concurring). In Creek, the entire case
was dictum, since the child in question had already been released from the interim
detention facilities. The result of In re Elmore was a mere remand, not an order of
specific treatment which the child had alleged he needed. In Wyatt, the court subse-
quently found the new treatment process to be inadequate, and ordered new efforts to
develop an adequate treatment program. This opinion was followed by subsequent
judicial action, reported at 344 F. Supp. 373, and 344 F. Supp. 387, where the court or-
dered far-ranging, exact standards as minimally required by the Constitution. At the
time this note went to press, the degree of compliance with that order was unknown.
119. Appropriations of funds is a legislative matter. The courts do not have the
power to order the legislature to appropriate funds. But cf. Ray v. South, 176 Ohio St.
241, 198 N.E.2d 919 (1964) (upholding a mandamus suit brought by a juvenile court
judge against county officials to expend monies required by state statute for the
salary and expenses of the juvenile court judge and court and for a detention fa-
cility). See also St. Louis Post Dispatch, Sept. 9, 1972, § A, at 3, col. 1. Furthermore,
it is possible courts can raise needed funds by either directing the sale of assets owned
by the institution or enjoining the state treasurer. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373,
377 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
120. The type of problem that will result is indicated by Schwartz v. Haines, 172
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method to assure adequate funds is persuasion. If that fails, courts
could release,1 21 or threaten to release, all youths who allege that their
confinement is without treatment. The courts could also set an arbi-
trary date after which no more commitments would be ordered. 122  If
the legislatures failed to respond, the result might be the closing of in-
adequate institutions and the release of highly dangerous individuals
into society. Even if unlimited financial resources were available,
however, there is a strong possibility that there would not be enough
trained personnel to implement the treatment mandate. 123
The court that declares a constitutional right to institutional treat-
ment will also have to define its own review function. Several meth-
ods are possible. Judge Bazelon, the principle architect of a right to
institutional treatment, indicated that a subjective standard' is to be
Ohio St. 572, 179 N.E.2d 46 (1962), where the court upheld a commitment order of
a mentally deficient juvenile to a state mental health institution over the objections of
the institution's director that no space was available. An over-crowded institution
would obviously not be able to provide adequate treatment.
121. See, e.g., In re I., 64 Misc. 2d 878, 316 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Far. Ct. 1970). Few
cases have actually ordered the release of a mentally ill person, which shows the
ineffectiveness of a treatment suit. In Daniels v. Director of Patuxent Institution, 243
Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966), the release of Daniels was upheld because he never
should have been institutionalized in the first place. Judge Bazelon's standard for de-
termining the release of those who have not received treatment would be: (1) the
length of time without adequate treatment; (2) the degree of danger to the community;
and (3) prospect for successful treatment. Bazelon, The Right of Mental Patients to
Treatment and Remuneration for Institutional Work, 39 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 543, 547
(1968). For Bazelon's definition of dangerousness, see Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589,
595 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
122. See, e.g., In re Savoy, No. 70-4808 (D.C. Juv. Ct., Oct. 13, 1970).
123. Powell v. Texas, 393 U.S. 516, 528 n.22 (1968); TAsK FoRcE: CoRaacrioNs,
supra note 13, at 145. This problem was recognized in Rouse, where it is stated that,
even though the problem could not be remedied immediately, "indefinite delay cannot
be approved. The rights here asserted are present rights . . . and, unless there is an
overwhelming reason, they are to be promptly fulfilled." 373 F.2d at 458 (emphasis
original). Two commentators have suggested different solutions for this personnel
problem. One suggests that since many people presently institutionalized do not need
psychiatric care, and only better custodial care, more trained people in the custodial
function could be supplied. Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEO. L.J. 753,
773 (1969). But see Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
Another commentator has suggested that the medical licensure requirements be
changed. See Szaz, The Right to Health, 57 GEo. L.J. 734 (1969).
124. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The court stated
(emphasis added):
The hospital need not show that the treatment will cure or improve him but
only that there is a bona fide effort to do so. This requires the hospital to
show initial and periodic inquiries are made into the needs and conditions of
the patient with a view towards providing suitable treatment for him, and thatWashington University Open Scholarship
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adopted. Under this standard, the court would inquire whether a suit-
able treatment effort was being provided for that particular individual.
On the other hand, a court could employ a more objective approach
by comparing the institution's staff-patient ratio, expenses, facilities,
and treatment methods with an accepted norm.125 If the institution
complied with these quantifiable criteria, the inmate's petition would
automatically fail. Another approach to review would be for the insti-
tution to establish an intra-institutional panel, with the court receiving
"appeals." '126 A final approach, probably the one most adaptable to
the juvenile system, would require courts to evaluate whether the treat-
ment provided was as nearly as possible the equivalent of that which
would be provided by the youth's parents.'2 7
Difficulties exist with all these alternatives. Underlying these al-
ternatives is the issue of how the courts will assess the adequacy of the
the program provided is suited to his particular needs.
For an application of this standard, see Eidnoff v. Connally, 281 F. Supp. 191 (W.D.
Tex. 1968). Another subjective standard that has been suggested is an "Is he im-
proving?" test. See Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness and the Right to Treatment,
77 YALE L.J. 87, 108 (1967).
125. One such proposed standard for juvenile institutions for the personnel require-
ment has the following criteria:
1 psychiatrist for each 150 children
1 psychologist for each 150 children
1 social case worker for each 30 children
1 trained recreation person for every 50 children
1 supervisor for each 8-10 cottage staff members
1 registered nurse during working hours
1 teacher for each 15 children with ability sixth grade or above
1 teacher for each 10 children with ability fifth grade or below
1 teacher for each child with below third grade ability
1 full time librarian for each institution.
TAsE FoRCE: CORRECriONS, supra note 13, at 212. For cases imposing an ob-
jective standard, see Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 376, 379-86 (M.D. Ala.
1972) (mental health hospital); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395-407 (M.D.
Ala. 1972) (institution for mentally retarded).
A serious problem with objective standards is that they may be set so high that no
institution can meet the standards. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir.
1966). Another difficulty is that "some less conscientious states may desire to abandon
all pretense of providing public treatment and confine their mental health program to
preventive detention of the dangerous ... [or] use habitual offender statutes to ac-
complish the same end." Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness and the Right to Treat-
ment, 77 YALE LJ. 87, 112 (1967).
126. See note 47 supra.
127. See Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 211.201
(1969); R.I. GwN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-2 (1970); STANDARD JUVENmE CouRT Acr, § 1
(1959).
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treatment. 121 A subjective approach would force the courts to deal
with highly divergent, complex psychiatric and medical theories. In
Rouse v. Cameron1'2 . Judge Bazelon suggested that courts already deal
with such complexities in medical malpractice suits.1 0 But the ade-
quacy and effectiveness of medical treatment traditionally are not the
issues courts most effectively handle.' The adoption of a subjective
standard would also tend to crowd the dockets, since each case would
have to be resolved individually. An objective approach, however,
may discourage judicial review. Once the review process established
that an institution complied with the established standards, subsequent
challenges would receive rubber stamp rejection. 3 A possible defi-
ciency of intra-institutional boards is that the inmates might be afraid to
128. See generally Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEo. L.J. 752, 753-57
(1969); Halpern, supra note 23, at 782, 790-94. Treatment may be "adequate" even
though it is not the very best possible. See Note, Civil Restraint, The Mental Illness
and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87, 113-14 (1967). Judge Johnson, in
Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), stated three criteria needed
for adequate treatment: (1) a humane psychological and physical environment; (2)
qualified staff in sufficient numbers; and (3) individualized treatment plans. 334 F.
Supp. at 1343.
129, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
130. Id. at 457 n.30. One commentator has pointed out that this analogy is weak,
since a determination of adequacy does not involve the legal concept of negligence.
Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87, 110
(1972).
131. In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966), Mr. Justice Fortas,
speaking for the Court, stated (emphasis added):
Apart from raising questions as to the adequacy of custodial and treatment
facilities and policies, some of which are not within judicial competence, the
case presents important challenges to the procedure of the police and Juve-
nile Court officials upon apprehension of a juvenile suspected of serious of-
fenses.
Accord, Glasco v. Brassard, 94 Idaho 162, 166, 483 P.2d 924, 927 (1971). BRAXEL,
supra note 10, at 60, quoting from an ABA study on civil commitment procedures, states
that "The judge has neither the objective legal criteria nor the technical training to de-
cide the treatment issues at stake."
One way to avoid having the courts directly determine the adequacy issue is to use
masters, as juvenile courts have done in neglect hearings. See, e.g., In re E.M.D., 490
P.2d 658, 659 (Alas. 1971). Another device is to use a panel of experts to oversee
any treatment process a court orders to be implemented. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 373, 376 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
132. The view of Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger is that he may authorize judicial
review in civil commitment cases when "one alleges he is being detained without any
treatment." Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.,
concurring) (emphasis original). See also Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785
(M.D. Ala. 1971) (court review only to the extent to ascertain whether the treatment
program being utilized was medically acceptable).
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188 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1973:157
complain for fear of reprisal or denial of release. 13 3 Finally, the defi-
ciency of the parental care standard is that the courts will be forced to
make extremely subjective evaluations as to what treatment and care a
youth would be provided at home. 134
The selection of a standard of judicial review and the approach
adopted to assess the adequacy of treatment will have a significant im-
pact on the right to institutional treatment. If courts restrict their in-
quiry only to whether some treatment is being provided,13 " the juve-
nile's constitutional right to institutional treatment would be ineffective,
since almost any institutional program could be defended as treat-
ment.3 6 If, on the other hand, the standard required that the treat-
ment be "effective,' 37 courts could become prescribers of medical
treatment, something clearly beyond judicial competence. Further-
more, if judicial review allows the courts to order specific and perhaps
expensive treatment, this could have a disastrous effect on the alloca-
tion of resources for both the treatment needs of others and the non-
133. However, one problem eliminated by administrative review would be the burden
on the courts caused by habeas corpus suits. Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness
and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.i. 87, 114 (1967). An administrative review
procedure would be the best among these alternatives. Bazelon, Implementing the Right
to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 738, 742-45 (1969).
134. Mora, supra note 101, at 198. This standard does not mean that the state
would provide precisely the same parental care the child had been receiving in the home.
This is because the deficiency in the home environment is one reason for the juvenile
courts to assume jurisdiction and also a possible cause of the child's delinquency.
See, e.g., In re Tillston, 225 La. 573, 73 So. 2d 466 (1954) (mother allowed male
friend to have intercourse with fourteen year old daughter). The conclusion, therefore,
is that if the standard of review for juveniles were "as nearly as possible" to that re-
ceived at home, then courts will necessarily have to decide what the parents ought to
have been providing. This sort of evaluation makes this standard, without specific
legislative or administrative guidelines, a very subjective and unmanageable one. But
see Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972),
where the court used this logic to condemn practices regarding exercise, medical needs,
education and solitary confinement at a state institution in order to prevent action by
the state which, if done by a parent, would justify juvenile court intervention.
135. See note 132 supra.
136. For a summary of various psychiatric theories, see L. BovET, PSYCHIATICu
TREATMENT OF JUVENILE, DELINQUENTS (1952); Cameron, Nonmedical Judgments of
Medical Matters, 57 GEO. L.J. 716 (1969). Cf. Note, Hospitalization of Mentally Ill
Criminals in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 110 U. PA. L. Rv. 78, 86 (1961), where
correctional authorities defend a prison-like atmosphere as treatment. But see Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (court found treatment program to
be "scientifically and medically inadequate").
137. See LeVine & Bornstein, Is the Sociopath Treatable? The Contribution of Psy-
chiatry to a Legal Dilemma, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 693 (authors state that "adequate"
to doctors means "effective" treatment).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/10
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treatment needs (such as laundry services and food) of the individual
petitioners.
Since the judicial review process will require the institution's staff
to testify, it may hamper the institution's ability to provide treat-
ment." It may also breed hostility between staff workers and in-
mates, since the staff is being forced to defend their practices. A
problem also arises as to the youth's presence at trial. The revelation
of diagnostic information in open court to determine whether the action
of the institution's authorities was justified may be psychiatrically detri-
mental to the youth. This difficulty is not overcome by a suggestion
of in camera disclosure, since the youth may not then believe he is be-
ing dealt with fairly because all the facts upon which the court bases
its decision are not revealed to him.
If a right to treatment exists, what is to be done for those who are
untreatable? 13 9 One solution would be to completely release these ju-
veniles. The attractiveness of this alternative, however, depends upon
the dangerousness of the youth. Another solution is to keep the youth
confined while requiring continuing treatment efforts on the part of
the institution. 140
Finally, if a right to treatment is declared, would there also be a con-
verse right not to be treated?' If there were a right to refuse treat-
ment, " " and a juvenile exercised this alternative, the court would then
138. This is because much staff time would be used in this type of suit. Cf. Dob-
son v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519, 522-23 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Danaher, J., concurring).
139. See generally Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction,
36 U. CH. L. REV. 760, 766-67 (1969); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness and the
Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87, 113-14 (1967). Part of the issue of being "un-
treatable" stems from patients who are uncooperative. For a discussion of this prob-
lem, see Halpern, supra note 23, at 800-02; Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness and the
Right to Trcatment, 77 YALE LJ. 87, 112-13 (1967).
140. See Katz, supra note 139, at 775-78. A collateral problem for those youths
who remain in confinement is the issue of professional experimentation. To control
e\perinientation of new techniques, the court could require professionals to obtain
court permission before proceeding. If the courts were to pass on the issue, they
would be making, at best, an educated guess at its success, as well as its propriety.
To ignore this issue, however, may be even worse.
141. For the issues raised by the problem of state coercion in the treatment process,
see generally Katz, supra note 139, at 767-83.
142. See United States v. Carroll, 436 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (due process does
not require consent of the offender before the offender may be sentenced under the
Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act); Watson v. United States, 406 F.2d 521 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), modified on rehearing, 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Several state
statutes require that consent be given before mental health treatment efforts will begin.
Vol. 1973:1571
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have to permit either a "warehousing" of the juvenile until his majority
or release him; and, if the former alternative is chosen, to somehow
reconcile that disposition with the doctrine of parens patriae.
E. The Reaction of the Juvenile Justice Process to a Right to Treat-
ment
When examining the wisdom of establishing a new constitutional
right, it is important to gauge the possible impact of that right upon the
system within which it will operate. If the impact is likely to be ad-
verse, or if implementation of other procedures by those authorities af-
fected by the right would tend to negate its impact, then it is wise not
to judicially create such a constitutional right.
The application of the right to juvenile treatment could be under-
mined by two possible responses in other phases of the juvenile process.
There may be an increase in the informal, nonjudicial settlement of
cases at both the police and the juvenile court intake stages, and an en-
hanced tendency' 43 to waive jurisdiction over juveniles who commit
criminal offenses. If either of these reactions occurred, the right to
treatment would be undermined by the diversion of juveniles away
from the juvenile process.
If a right to treatment were held applicable to the juvenile process,
it could have several undesirable consequences in the correctional
phase. Since the courts would be defining institutional treatment in
constitutional language, this would inextricably interweave the consti-
tutional right to treatment to perpetuate institutions. This could have
the immediate effect of impeding experimentation and development of
intracommunity rehabilitation programs and de-emphasizing the efforts
being made by other professionals to deal with juveniles by detecting
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.130 (1969); CAL. WEL1. & INST'NS CODE § 7104
(Deering 1969). There is an additional problem in the concept of consent by juve-
niles; namely, their ability to give consent itself. Cf. in re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 55
(1967) (discussion of the consent and waiver problem in the right to counsel context).
143. See United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973, 976 (D.D.C. 1971) (noting
that forty-three "treatable" juveniles had been waived to the adult courts during a
three month period because of the lack of juvenile facilities); Bazelon, Racism, Classism
and the Juvenile Process, 63 JUDICATURE 373 (1970); Goodman, supra note 24, at
695-96. However, Goodman points out that theoretically this possible "backfire"
should be blocked by Kent v. United States and Haziel v. United States. Id. at 696-98.
Another possible effect of finding a right to institutional treatment would be in the
opposite direction-a massive effort to develop noninstitutional programs, stimulated
by a desire to curtail the high costs of custodial care.
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delinquency in its early states' and by matching personality traits to
dispositions.', A second undesirable effect at this stage might be that
many juveniles may not need "treatment"; 140 and yet because institu-
tions would be geared to psychiatric treatment, the juvenile may come
to believe he needs "treatment.' 4 7  A third potential undesirable con-
sequence could be that the institution will aim at only maintaining the
treatment level required by the Constitution and become inflexible to
providing additional treatment for the special needs of particular juve-
niles24
An additional potential impact could be state 4 9 liability'5" for the
144. See A. BREED, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CLASSIFICATION TO THE FIELD OF CORREC-
TIONS (1966); H. HILL, A GENERAL PLAN FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN OFFENDER
DISPOSITION SYSTEM (1966); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, U.S. TASK FORCE: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY REPORT 47
(1967), M. WARREN, CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENDERS AS AN AID TO EFFICIENT MANAGE-
MENT AND EFFECTIVE TREATMENT (1966).
145. See S. RuBENFIELD, IMPLICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES AND RESEARCH
FOR CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL (1966); TASK FORCE: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY,
supra note 3, at 411-19; S. WHEELER & L. COATRELL, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: ITS PRE-
VENTION AND CONTROL (1966).
146. State statutes seem to recognize this and provide that mentally ill juveniles are
to be diverted to the mental health system. See, e.g., ARIZ. STAT. § 8-244 (1970).
See also J. CONRAD, TRENDS IN EUROPEAN CORRECTIONS 16 (1966); note 74 supra.
147. Cf. L. BOVET, PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 9 (1951), where
the author states that, although juveniles as individuals are psychiatrically unique, once
juveniles are processed by the juvenile justice system they become psychologically
homogenous with all other juveniles that have been similarly processed. However,
this analysis seems at odds with common sense. It seems that psychologically distinct
individuals will react differently to a uniform stimulus; that is, being processed. More-
over, not all juveniles are processed in exactly the same manner.
The other dangers implicit in an emphasis on psychiatric institutional treatment,
which would result from a right to institutional treatment, are that other factors in the
rehabilitation process, such as employment once back in the community, may be down-
played. J. CONRAD, TRENDS IN EUROPEAN CORRECTIONS 15-16 (1966). Also, because
of the subjective and "arbitrary nature" of psychiatric recommendations for release,
the therapist's acceptance by both the (prison) inmates and administrative staffs will
tend to be limited. Id. at 17. This phenomenon may also develop in juvenile institu-
tions if a right to institutional treatment were applied to juveniles.
148. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 376 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
149. One commentator has suggested that the federal government assume the re-
sponsibility for those juveniles who need institutional psychiatric attention. It was felt
that better staffing would result. R. MCGEE & E. REIMER, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S
ROLE IN CORRECTIONS 24 (1966). If the federal government were to assume the re-
sponsibility for treatment, the potential liability that may have existed for the state
would run to the federal government, unless blocked by assertion of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
150. In addition to liability, the right to treatment would presumably enable the
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failure of its institutions to provide needed treatment. This may be an
unexpected surprise for a state that declares a constitutional right to
treatment, but two lines of cases intimate the possibility of state liabil-
ity. States have been held liable for foreseeable physical injuries'51
which occurred to inmates of its institutions, and have also been denied
reimbursement from the parents for failure of state institutions to pro-
vide treatment. 152  It is possible to conclude that states would be liable
in tort or false imprisonment for failure to provide treatment. 15 Fi-
parents of children who need treatment sua sponte to force the government to make
extra expenditures for their child's treatment. See Leitner v. County of Westchester,
38 App. Div. 2d 554, 328 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1971).
Furthermore, in addition to state liability towards inmates for undue incarcerations,
the state may also have to pay attorney fees in bringing the suit. See Newman v. State,
349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972) ($12,000 awarded to attorneys in suit challenging
medical conditions and treatment in state prisons); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373,
378, 408-10 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (awarding approximately $36,000 to three attorneys in-
volved in the case for plaintiffs).
151. Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1971) (recovery allowable against
warden for shotgun wounds; court also stated that the eighth amendment is a spring-
board for personal tort recovery); Lewis v. State, 176 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App. 1965)
(state liable for death of a juvenile caused by a flogging administered by state training
school officials); McBride v. State, 52 Misc. 2d 880, 277 N.Y.S.2d 80 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(state liable for suicide committed at state training school). See also Green v. State,
30 Mich. App. 648, 186 N.W.2d 792 (1971) (adult prisoner can recover from the state
for an injury sustained while operating machinery at a state prison); Scolvino v. State,
297 N.Y. 460, 74 N.E.2d 174 (1947) (state liable for an attack by one mental patient
on another patient). But see Flaherty v. State, 296 N.Y. 342, 73 N.E.2d 543 (1947)
(state not liable for one juvenile pouring fire extinguisher acid on another juvenile).
A second theory that has been used to impose liability upon the state is false imprison-
ment. Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (due to
negligent psychiatric care, plaintiff detained for an overly long period of time in a
state mental hospital). It also should be noted that such unexplainable long detentions
are not infrequent. See Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEo. L.J. 752, 774-78
(1969); Rosenberg, Treatment Denied: The Case of Arnold Marman, 57 GEo. L.J. 702
(1969). It is unlikely, however, that such long detentions could occur in the juvenile
process, since the juvenile court's jurisdiction is usually only until the youth's ma-
jority. But the principle of tort recovery based on a theory of false imprisonment
would be the same if a right to treatment were imposed on the juvenile correctional
process.
A right to treatment may also unexpectedly impose on the institution's staff not only
civil, but also criminal liability. People v. McMillian, 45 Cal. App. 2d 740, 114 P.2d
440 (1941) (director of the state training school criminally liable for corporeal punish-
ment of inmates, which was prohibited by statute; convicted on three counts of assault
and battery).
152. See note 113 supra.
153. The amount of damages recoverable may be small, as has been the general rule
in cases when a juvenile commits suicide in a juvenile institution. Damages are deter-
mined by the pecuniary loss to the family, which involves proof that the juvenile would
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/10
TREATMENT FOR JUVENILES
nally, if a juvenile right to treatment were declared, other groups may
be deprived of adequate attention because of the demand on funds,
space and personnel which would be required for the treatment of ju-
veniles. ' 54
These probable effects would tend to negate the practicality and wis-
dom of the judiciary alone trying to implement a constitutional right to
institutional treatment for juveniles.
IV. NONINSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT IN THE JUVENILE
CORRECTION PROCESS
The juvenile correctional process involves more than institutions; it
involves processing juveniles in the community, including probation,' 55
aftercare,'5  and informal settlements. 157  The same two initial ques-
tions that were discussed regarding the institutional phase-the requi-
site judicial outlook and the underlying assumptions'Is--emerge again
in the noninstitutional phase.
In assessing the validity of possible constitutional arguments,' 59 they
have been gainfully employed, aided his parents, and remained out of institutions. See
McBride v. State, 52 Misc. 2d 880, 277 N.Y.S.2d 80 (Ct. Cl. 1967). But cf. Whitree v.
State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (award of $300,000).
154. The specter of this problem was raised in United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F.
Supp. 973, 979 (D.D.C. 1971), where the court suggested that the center for alcoholics
be converted into a youth detention center. This suggestion was not adopted, however.
Id. at 981-83.
155. See generally TASK FORCE: CoRRECIoNs, supra note 13, at 130-41; Mack,
The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 116 (1909).
156. See generally TASK FORCE: CORREMCTONS, supra note 13, at 149-54.
157. For a description of the informal settlement process by the police, see Note,
Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts and Individualized Justice, 79 H.ARv.
L. REv. 775, 776-85 (1966). For a discussion of informal settlements at the juvenile
court intake stage, see Note, Informal Disposition of Delinquency Cases: Survey and
Conpa,ison of Court Delegation of Decision Making, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 258. Because
of the low visibility of informal settlements, they are considered only peripherally here.
158. See notes 38-65 supra and accompanying text. In the noninstitutional phase,
the assumption that treatment is the legislative purpose is theoretically stronger than in
the institutional phase. This is because such justifications behind institutionalization
as deterrence, incapacitation, and dangerousness are inapplicable when the juvenile is
kept in the community. The underlying assumption of parens patriae and of continua-
tion of institutions are not directly relevant in the noninstitutional phase.
159. In considering whether there is a right to noninstitutional treatment, three lines
of constitutional arguments which were advanced for institutional treatment may be
eliminated. Due process arguments are generally inappropriate because no confinement
is involved, and it is in confinement that "deprivations of liberty" can most readily be
found. However, due process and cruel and unusual punishment arguments have been
applied to determine which conditions of probation and aftercare are permissible. See
Vol. 1973:1571
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first must be balanced against the constitutional right of privacy.'""
Unlike institutional treatment, in which only the privacy of the juvenile
is affected, noninstitutional treatment would necessarily involve third
parties, such as the juvenile's peers, family, employer, and teachers. It
is the privacy of these third parties that is the crucial issue."' It is un-
known to what degree the necessary governmental involvement in
a full-blown right to noninstitutional treatment will directly interfere
with the privacy, freedom, and social attitude of those with whom the
juvenile comes into contact. Because this is an unknown factor, a
balancing of the constitutional right to privacy against possible argu-
ments for a right to noninstitutional treatment can not be made in the
absence of a specific factual context. But, assuming that the privacy
issue is not presented, the merits of the conceivable constitutional argu-
ments can be analyzed.
There are only two constitutional arguments, independent of a right
to institutional treatment, which could be advanced for a constitutional
right to noninstitutional treatment. First is the "fair start in life" argu-
ment which, for the reasons discussed earlier, is not convincing.
1 2
The second argument is that, if a juvenile needed treatment but was de-
nied it, that denial would somehow constitute either punishment0 3 or
violate the fundamental fairness test.164 This argument is weak be-
cause the denial of treatment to one not institutionalized cannot be
classified as "punishment,"'" 5 or as a "deprivation of liberty" amount-
generally Note, Juvenile Probation, Restrictions, Rights and Rehabilitation, 16 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 276, 279-90 (1972). But as a practical matter, the conditions of proba-
tion and aftercare will always be subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution.
Second, an argument could not be made on the basis of Mr. Justice Black's law of the
land theory, see notes 75-76 supra, since the statutory guidelines for probation and after-
care are unclear. Third, arguments based on equal protection, see notes 27, 29-30 supra,
and due process, see notes 24-25 supra, are concerned with procedures and practices of
confinement. Hence they are obviously inapplicable, since there is no institutional
confinement in this context.
160. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964). Cf. Wyman v. James,
403 U.S. 503 (1970).
161. The privacy of the juvenile is not crucial even in the noninstitutional context
since the judicial conception of probation is of "an act of grace." See Escoe v. Zerbst,
295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935).
162. See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
163. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
164. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
165. Even if such a denial is punishment, the logic of Robinson v. California,
360 U.S. 660 (1962), is that if one is not institutionalized, then no treatment has to be
provided.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/10
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ing to a violation of due process. An argument which is dependent
upon a constitutional right to institutional treatment is that in order to
prevent a relapse106 and to assure continuing juvenile court jurisdic-
tion,'x 7 there should be a corollary right to noninstitutional treatment.
The weakness of this last argument is that, even if a right to treatment
was required for the institutional phase, it would not constitutionally
justify an automatic carryover into the noninstitutional phase. This is
especially true if, in deciding that the right to institutional treatment
existed, the courts relied upon a theory relating to the manner and
process of one's confinement in an institution.
If it is concluded that there is a right to noninstitutionalized treat-
ment, one additional practical difficulty 6" would confront the courts.
Unlike institutional treatment, in which the courts have the power to
order the directors of institutions (because they are governmental offi-
cials) to take certain steps, the courts in dealing with noninstitutional
treatment cannot order a community to accept out-patient delinquents,
order employers to hire delinquents, or enjoin educators to develop or
to staff special programs.
There are four probable effects 0 9 of judicially declaring a right to
noninstitutional treatment in the juvenile process. First, there will be
an increase in the number of settlements at informal police and juve-
nile courts intake. Secondly, without a corollary right to institutional
treatment, there could easily be an increase in the number of juvenile
commitments or waivers to the criminal process. Thirdly, a state may
be liable for acts commited by juveniles under its supervision while liv-
ing in the community.' 70 Fourthly, since urban areas have more
trained personnel than rural areas, it is logical to conclude a disparity
in the exercise of a right to noninstitutional rehabilitation would result.
166. Cf. BRAKEL, supra note 10, at 134.
167. The probation and aftercare periods are, of course, already within the con-
tinuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court. However, this concept of continuing jurisdic-
tion is important, since it enables privately run services to receive state funds. See In
re Proposal C., 384 Mich. 390, 185 N.W.2d 9, 24 (1971); BRAKEL, supra note 10, at 135.
168. See notes 98-142 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of other diffi-
culties in the application of the right in the context of institutional treatment.
169. See notes 143-54 supra and accompanying text
170. Compare Geiger v. Department of Inst'ns, 242 So. 2d 606 (La. Ct. App. 1970)
(state liable for act of forcible rape committed by training school escapees), with Evan-
gelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965) (no
state liability for the conduct of an escapee of a state institution in setting fire to a
church).
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These effects would tend to negate the effectiveness of a right to nonin-
stitutional treatment.
V. CONCLUSION
A juvenile right to treatment' 7' should not be judicially created and
is inappropriate to the juvenile justice process. 2  It would force the
courts: to adopt an untenable judicial attitude;17 to base argu-
ments upon faulty assumptions; 74 to rely on weak constitutional ar-
guments; 17 5 to create insurmountable problems for judicial manage-
ment; 76 and to possibly cause an unfavorable chain reaction within
the juvenile justice process. 77 This conclusion, however, should not
preclude the judiciary from intervening in the juvenile correctional
process .1' The courts can narrow juvenile court jurisdiction, limit the
availability of institutions as a place of commitment, require proper
classifications of juveniles within the system, continue to supervise the
conditions and practices of institutions, and advocate legislative action.
171. If a right to treatment were incorporated into the juvenile process, the first
question would be whether the definition and concept is to be broadened to include
more than a medical-psychiatric phase. Additional treatment phases might be education
and adjusting social values and family life. If a broadening of the definition of the
right to treatment occurred and included more than a psychiatric basis, the issues dis-
cussed in this note would be magnified in two areas-defining (and administering) such
a right and the protection of third party privacy.
172. This note has dealt with whether the judiciary must recognize a juvenile right to
treatment. Note, however, that a statutory right to treatment created by the legislatures,
although avoiding constitutional problems, would encounter the same practical prob-
lems as a judicially established right. Such difficulties would include state liability for
improper treatment, inadequacy of facilities, lack of trained personnel, lack of workable
standards of judicial review, inadequate sources of funding, and, finally, possible techni-
cal insufficiency of the psychiatric disciplines. It is questionable if legislative drafting
can dispose of all these problems at this time.
173. See notes 38-48 supra and accompanying text.
174. See notes 49-66, 158 supra and accompanying text.
175. See notes 67-97, 159-67 supra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 119-42, 168 supra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 143-54, 169-70 supra and accompanying text.
178. Cf. cases cited 107-18 supra, which begin to accomplish major objectives of
right to treatment without actually adjudicating a constitutional right.
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